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MODERATING POLITICS 
IN POST-CONFLICT STATES: 
AN EXAMINATION OF BOSNIA 
AND HERZEGOVINA 
Angela M. Banks * 
The individuals who negotiated the peace agreement that ended 
the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina considered ethnicity to be the 
most salient division within Bosnian society. Consequently they or-
ganized Bosnia 's political structure around ethnic representation. 
While it is doubtful that peace in Bosnia would have been possible 
without guarantees for ethnic-based political representation, such 
guarantees have proven insufficient for building a functioning, sta-
ble, and cohesive state. This article analyzes the role that Bosnia's 
political framework, which focuses exclusively on ethnic representa-
tion, has played in impeding the development of a significant cadre 
of moderate political actors and in hindering the success of the exist-
ing political moderates. Based on an examination of electoral and 
institutional approaches for increasing moderate political participa-
tion in Bosnia, this article concludes that the electoral alternatives 
readily available in Bosnia are unlikely to deter the extreme nation-
alist parties from focusing on ethnic-identity politics or to foster the 
development of political parties that represent the interests of Bos-
nians across ethnic lines. This article outlines a structural reform 
that could enable Bosnia's current political structure to represent a 
broader range of Bosnian identities and interests and could facilitate 
increased participation of moderate political actors. 
• Legal Advisor, Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, The Hague, The Netherlands. J.D. Har-
vard Law School, 2000; M.Litt. University ofOxford, 1997; B.A. Spelman College, 1995. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Ten years after the signing of the General Framework Agreement for 
Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina ("Dayton Peace Agreement," "Dayton Ac-
cords," or "Dayton"), 1 which ended the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the 
Bosnian government has failed to live up to the international community's 
expectation that it build an efficient and cohesive state. To fill this govern-
ance gap, Bosnia's civilian administrator, the High Representative, has as-
sumed a more central role in governing the country. Since December 1997, 
the High Representative has had the authority to unilaterally implement leg-
1 General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina with Annexes, Dec. 
14, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 170 (1996) [hereinafter General Framework Agreement]. 
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islation, rewrite existing legislation if it conflicts with the Dayton Peace 
Agreement, and remove government officials who obstruct the Dayton Peace 
Agreement or the High Representative's efforts to fulfill his mandate. 2 Suc-
cessive High Representatives have frequently utilized these powers, with 
Paddy Ashdown, the current High Representative, removing nine govern-
ment officials as of December 16, 2004.3 
Bosnia's governance problem is largely the result of long-term inaction 
by its elected officials. Elections in 1996 enabled the extreme nationalist po-
litical parties that were dominant during the war to maintain their political 
power. Several of these parties have worked to maintain separate ethnic ter-
ritories within Bosnia and have worked to obstruct the implementation of 
Dayton when it would facilitate the development of a central Bosnian state. 
For example, government officials have blocked efforts to facilitate the re-
turn of refugees and displaced persons. Such returns would have signifi-
cantly reversed the effects of ethnic cleansing in certain parts of the country. 
Bosnia is in need of moderate political elites--political actors who rec-
ognize the importance of a thriving Bosnian state and the perils of political 
fragmentation,4 and who will work to improve the state's cohesion and sta-
bility.5 Moderate political elites, as defined in this article, are politicians 
2 Carlos L. Yordan, Resolving the Bosnian Conflict: European Solutions, 27 FLETCHER F. 
WORLD AFF. 147, 157 (2003) [hereinafter Yordcin]; see also Peace Implementation Council, 
Bonn Conclusions, art. Xl(2)( c), Dec. 1 0, 1997, available at 
http://www.ohr.int/pic/default.asp?content_id=5182 ("The Council welcomes the High Rep-
resentative's intention to use his final authority in theatre regarding interpretation of the 
Agreement on the Civilian Implementation of the Peace Settlement in order to facilitate the 
resolution of difficulties by making binding decisions, as he judges necessary, on the follow-
ing issues: . . . other measures to ensure implementation of the Peace Agreement throughout 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and its Entities, as well as the smooth running of the common insti-
tutions. Such measures may include actions against persons holding public office or officials 
who are absent from meetings without good cause or who are found by the High Representa-
tive to be in violation of legal commitments made under the Peace Agreement or the terms for 
its implementation."). 
3 On December 16, 2004, Ashdown announced that he was removing nine Republika Srpska 
government officials from office because he had "good reason to believe [they had] helped 
war criminals and their networks, or [had] failed in their duties to take active steps to catch 
war criminals." Office of the High Representative (OHR), Statement by the High Representa-
tive, Paddy Ashdown at Today's Press Conference (Dec. 16, 2004), available at 
http://www .ohr. int/ohr-dept/presso/pressb/default.asp?content_id=33 7 41. 
4 Arend Lijphart, Consociational Democracy, 21 WoRLD PoL. 207 (1969), reprinted in 
CONSOCIATIONAL DEMOCRACY: POLITICAL ACCOMMODATION IN SEGMENTED SOCIETIES 79 
(Kenneth D. McRae ed., 1974) [hereinafter Consociational Democracy]. 
5 /d. 
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willing to work with representatives of different segments6 of society to re-
solve political disputes in a manner that promotes the state's cohesion while 
addressing the concerns of citizens. 7 In many respects, moderate political el-
ites in Bosnia will support the active implementation of the Dayton Accords 
because they outline an agreed-upon plan for turning Bosnia into a produc-
tive, cohesive, and stable state. Unfortunately these moderates have not ex-
perienced significant electoral success in the last ten years. Without in-
creased moderate political involvement in Bosnia, there is little chance that 
the government will be able or willing to adequately protect the civil, politi-
cal, and social rights of the Bosnian people, as outlined in the Dayton Peace 
Agreement. Without such government protection, a need will continue to 
exist for a highly interventionist High Representative. Such involvement by 
the High Representative, however, cannot be relied upon given the interna-
tional community's waning interest in the Balkans.8 Thus, the development 
of local institutions that will operate to protect these rights is essential. 
This article analyzes the role that Bosnia's political framework, which 
focuses exclusively on ethnic representation,9 has played in impeding the 
6 Segments refer to socially differentiated groups within a society. Segments can be of a reli-
gious, ideological, regional, cultural, ethnic, linguistic, or racial nature among others. See 
AREND LIJPHART, DEMOCRACY rN PLURAL SOCIETIES: A COMPARATIVE EXPLORATION 3-4 
(1977) [hereinafter DEMOCRACY IN PLURAL SOCIETIES]. Plural societies are divided along 
what Harry Eckstein terms "segmental cleavages." !d. at 3. Segmental cleavages refer to the 
political divisions within a society that closely follow social divisions within that society. !d. 
at 4. 
1 This definition draws on Arend Lijphart's work in describing political leaders in consocia-
tional democracies. See id. at 25. 
8 See, e.g., Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, Assessing the Impact of the International Criminal Tri-
bunal for the former Yugoslavia (Nov. 6, 2003) (Keynote Address at the University of Texas 
School of Law International War Crimes Trials: Making a Difference? Conference, on file 
with author) ("The Security Council has called upon the ICTY to complete all investigations 
by 2004, finish all trials by 2008 and conclude all appeals by 2010. The completion strategy 
has three components .... First, the Tribunal will focus on the trials of major leaders. Second, 
cases of lower- and mid-level accused will be transferred to courts of the former Yugoslavia. 
Finally, it is said that guilty pleas with plea agreements will enhance the likelihood of meeting 
the completion goals.") (citation omitted). 
9 The Bosnian Constitution provides two bases for political representation: ethnicity and terri-
tory. Political positions are allocated to Bosniacs, Bosnian Croats, and Bosnian Serbs and to 
individuals from the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska. Gen-
eral Framework Agreement, supra note 1, at Annex 4 arts. IV, V (Constitution of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina). Territorial representation is, however, de facto ethnic representation because 
of the majority Bosniac and Bosnian Croat population in the Federation of Bosnia and Herze-
govina and the majority Bosnian Serb population in the Republika Srpska. See Ivo. H. 
DAALDER, GETTING TO DAYTON 27 (2000) [hereinafter DAALDER]; Paul C. Szasz, lntroduc-
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development of a significant cadre of moderate political actors, and in hin-
dering the political success of the existing political moderates. Based on an 
examination of electoral and institutional approaches for increasing moder-
ate political participation in Bosnia, the article concludes that the electoral 
alternatives readily available in Bosnia are unlikely to deter the extreme na-
tionalist parties from focusing on ethnic-identity politics or to foster the de-
velopment of political parties that represent the interests of Bosnians across 
ethnic lines. In creating a political framework for Bosnia, the Dayton nego-
tiators created a consociational-like structure for Bosnia; but they left out a 
key component of consociational democracy: the grand coalition. 10 To ad-
dress this oversight, this article outlines a structural reform that could enable 
Bosnia's current political structure to represent a broader range of Bosnian 
identities and interests and to facilitate the increased participation of moder-
ate political actors. 
The first section of this article provides an overview of the war that took 
place in Bosnia and Herzegovina between 1991 and 1995 and the Dayton 
Peace Agreement that brought the conflict to an end. The second section in-
troduces the concept of consociationa1 democracy and its relevance to the 
political structure created for Bosnia in the Dayton Peace Agreement. The 
third and fourth sections discuss the damage done by the extreme nationalist 
governments in the absence of moderate political voices, and the interna-
tional community's response. The fmal part of this article examines elec-
toral and institutional approaches for increasing moderate political participa-
tion in highly segmented post-conflict societies like Bosnia. 
I. WAR AND PEACE 
A. Historical Background 
Bosnia and Herzegovina has been a multiethnic political entity for cen-
turies. When Bosnia was part of the Ottoman Empire (between 1463 and 
1878), many Slavs in the area converted to Islam, which gave rise to one of 
the three major ethnic groups in the area. 11 The other two major ethnic 
tory Note: Bosnia and Herzegovina-Croatia-Yugoslavia: General Framework Agreement for 
Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina With Annexes, 35 I.L.M. 75, 75-76 (1996) [hereinafter 
Szasz]. 
1° Consociational democracy is a form of government in which "the centrifugal tendencies 
inherent in a plural society are counteracted by the cooperative attitudes and behavior of the 
leaders of the different segments of the population." See, e.g., DEMOCRACY IN PLURAL 
SOCIETIES, supra note 6, at 1, 3. 
11 NOEL MALCOLM, BOSNIA: A SHORT HISTORY 43-44, 135 (2d ed. 1996) (hereinafter 
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groups are the Croats and Serbs. As the Tadic Trial Chamber noted, how-
ever, all three groups are Slav, "so it is no doubt, inaccurate to speak of three 
different ethnic groups; however, this appears to be accepted common us-
age."12 As ethnicity is a socially-constructed concept in which self-definition 
is paramount, this article refers to these population groups as ethnic groups. 13 
Throughout history, conflict existed between these ethnic groups in 
Bosnia, yet despite these historical tensions, the former Yugoslavia appeared 
to be a model multiethnic society in the post-World War II years under the 
leadership of Josip Broz Tito. 14 Yug<?slavia's 1946 Constitution divided the 
country into six Republics: Serqia, ~roatia, Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzego-
vina, Macedonia, and Montenegro. There were also two autonomous re-
gions, Vojvodina and Kosovo, which were closely ass.ociated with Serbia 
and Montenegro. 15 The people of each Republic were treated as distinct "na-
tions"16 within federal Yugoslavia, except the people of Bosnia. In contrast 
to the other five Republics, Bosnia had no majority ethnic group and a dis-
tinct Bosnian nation was not recognized in the Yugoslav constitution until 
1979.17 Bosnia continued to lack a majority ethnic group in 1991, when the 
population was 43.5% Bosniac, 18 32.1% Serb, 17.4% Croat, 5.5% Yugo-
slav, 19 and 2.4% other.20 · 
MALCOLM]; see also MISHA GLENNY, THE FALL OF YUGOSLAVIA: THE THIRD BALKAN WAR 
139 (1994). 
12 Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT -94-1-T, ·opinion and Judgment, para. 56 (May 7, 1997). 
13 Cf IAN F. HANEY L6PEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE 13-14 
( 1996) (discussing race as a social construction). 
14 See, e.g., MALCOLM, supra note 11, at 162-63, 202-03. 
15 Tadic, supra note 12, at para. 65. 
16 The term nation refers to "[a] body of people who possess the consciousness of a common 
identity, giving them a distinctiveness from other peoples." THE BLACKWELL DICTIONARY OF 
POLITICAL SciENCE 219 (Frank Bealey ed., 1999). The consciousness of the people is gener-
ally based on a common history and other shared features like culture, language, and geo-
graphic location. Id. Despite a common geographic location, multiple nations can live within 
the boundaries of one state and one nation can exist in multiple states. /d. Nation, as used in 
former Yugoslavia, follows this definition. See also ERIC HOBSBA WM & TERENCE RANGER, 
THE INVENTION OF TRADITION (1983) (discussing the ways in which the shared features of so-
cial groups are socially constructed). 
17 Tadic, supra note 12, at para. 65. While the 1974 Constitution did not recognize a Bosnian 
nationality, it did consider Bosniacs (Bosnian Muslims) to be a nation or peoples of Federal 
Yugoslavia. Id. ; GLENNY, supra note 11, at 141. 
18 Bosniac is a term used to refer to Bosnian Muslims. 
19 The category "Yugoslav" is generally comprised of individuals with parents of different 
ethnicities. Int'l Crisis Group, Elections in Bosnia & Herzegovina (ICG Bosnia Report No. 
16), at 2 (Sept. 22, 1996), available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index 
.cfm?id=l567&1=1 [hereinafter Elections in Bosnia & Herzegovina]. 
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Tito was able to construct a society in which Bosniacs, Croats, and 
Serbs lived side by side for approximately forty-five years with little, if any, 
ethnic-based conflict. This peace has generally been attributed to the repres-
sive techniques Tito used to discourage national ethnic identities and nation-
alist ideas or policies.21 Despite these efforts, the Bosnian population re-
mained acutely conscious of its Bosniac, Croat, and Serb identities.22 
B. Disintegration, War, and Ethnic Cleansing in the Former Yugoslavia 
Following Tito's death in 1980, the former Yugoslavia experienced sig-
nificant financial problems that culminated in an economic crisis.23 In 1990, 
the first multi-party elections took place in the Republics, and people voted 
primarily along ethnic lines.24 This resulted in the election of strongly na-
tionalistic parties.25 The three major political parties that emerged from the 
election in the Bosnian Republic were the Muslim Party of Democratic Ac-
tion (SDA), the Serb Democratic Party (SDS), and the Croat Democratic Un-
ion (HDZ).26 The SDA gained a narrow margin over the SDS for the Repub-
lican Assembly/7 which reflected the ethnic makeup of the Republic. The 
SDA and the SDS initially cooperated in the Republican Assembly, but their 
cooperation decreased steadily over time, becoming nonexistent by January 
1992. 
As the former Yugoslavia disintegrated, so did Bosnia. In February 
1992, Bosniacs and Bosnian Croats voted overwhelmingly for independence, 
via referendum, and Bosnia and Herzegovina declared its independence in 
20 !d. at 2. The 1991 figures are used because the last census was taken in April 1991. 
21 See, e.g., MALCOLM, supra note 11, at 193-94; Vesna Pesic, Serbian Nationalism and the 
Origins of the Yugoslav Crisis 2 (Apr. 1996) (United States Institute of Peace Report), avail-
able at http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/early/pesic/pesic; see also Tadic, supra note 
12, at para. 65-66. 
22 See, e.g., MALCOLM, supra note 11, at 197-98, 203-04; Pesic, supra note 21, at 2; see also 
Tadic, supra note 12, at para. 66. Focus on these identities may have been an unintended 
consequence of the unavailability of a broader identity option such as Bosnian. It is this arti-
cle's contention that the lack of such an identity has been detrimental to fostering overarching 
loyalties that may reduce the strength and intensity of ethnic identities, which increases the 
likely success of consociational democracy in deeply divided societies. 
23 Tadic, supra note 12, at para. 70. 
24 !d. at para. 68. 
25 /d. 
26 /d. at para. 81. 
27 The Republican Assembly was the legislative organ at the Republican level of government 
in the former Yugoslavia. 
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March 1992.28 Bosnian Serbs boycotted the referendum and responded to its 
results by declaring the existence and independence of their own state, the 
Republika Srpska, on January 9, 1992.29 The European Union and the United 
States recognized Bosnia as an independent state in April 1992 and war 
broke out that same month.30 
Bosniac and Bosnian Croat forces joined together to fight Bosnian 
Serbs, who were working with Serbia to create a "Serb-dominated western 
extension of Serbia. "31 This goal required taking over Serb-dominated areas 
of Croatia and Bosnia, despite their large Croat and Bosniac populations.32 
To address this problem, the parties to the conflict adopted the strategy of 
"ethnic cleansing," which involved removing individuals of the undesired 
ethnic group. The warring parties' tactics for removing individuals in order 
to change the ethnic demographics of an area included murder, forced trans-
fer, rape, and destruction of property.33 Over the course of the war and as al-
liances in Bosnia changed, 34 all parties to the conflict used ethnic cleansing 
as a means of obtaining ethnically homogeneous areas. 
The Bosniacs, Bosnian Croats, and Bosnian Serbs created new admini-
strations in the form of Republics to govern the portions of the Bosnian terri-
tory they controlled. The Bosniac-controlled area was the Republic of Bos-
nia and Herzegovina, the Bosnian Croat-controlled territory was the 
28 Tadic, supra note 12, at para. 78. 
29 /d. 
30 /d. In December 1990 the people of Slovenia voted overwhelmingly for independence 
from the former Yugoslavia. /d. at para. 73. Croatia followed suit in May 1991, also voting 
overwhelmingly for independence. !d. at para. 74. Both Republics declared their independ-
ence on June 25, 1991, which was recognized by the European Community on January 15, 
1992. /d. at para. 77. 
31 !d. at para. 84. 
32 /d. 
33 Lynn Hastings, Implementation of the Property Legislation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 37 
STAN. J. INT'L L. 221,221 (2001) (forced transfer and property destruction) [hereinafter Hast-
ings]. A UN Commission of Experts documented the use of "murder, torture, arbitrary arrest 
and detention, extrajudicial executions, rape and sexual assaults, confinement of civilian 
population in ghetto areas, forcible removal, displacement and deportation of civilian popula-
tion, deliberate military attacks or threats of attacks on civilians and civilian areas, and wan-
ton destruction of property" to effectuate ethnic cleansing. Final Report of the United Nations 
Commission of Experts on Former Yugoslavia, U.N. ESCOR, 49th Sess., at 131, U.N. Doc. 
S/1994/674 (1994). 
34 By the spring of 1993, the Bosniacs and Bosnian Croats were no longer working together. 
The Bosnian Croats went to war against the Bosniacs to gain control of central Bosnia and the 
Muslim portion of Mostar, the capital of the Herzegovina region. This region has been his-
torically important to Bosnian Croats. 
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Republic of Herceg-Sosna, and the Bosnian Serb-controlled republic was the 
Republika Srpska.35 During the war, the administrations of these republics 
enacted laws to solidify the desired ethnic composition that had been 
achieved through ethnic cleansing. 36 
C. The Negotiating History of the Dayton Peace Agreement 
The initial international effort to broker peace in the Balkans began in 
1992 but did not achieve immediate success. This effort was the Interna-
tional Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY), organized by the Euro-
pean Union (EU) and the UN. The initial solution advanced was the Vance-
Owen Plan, named for Cyrus Vance and David Owen, the first co-chairmen 
of the ICFY Steering Committee. This plan divided Bosnia into ten semi-
autonomous districts in an effort to balance two competing interests: a uni-
fied Bosnia and the parties' desire for ethnic autonomy.37 The United States 
had reservations about this plan because it considered it "both a reward for 
ethnic cleansing and largely unenforceable."38 Although then-U.S. President 
Bill Clinton initially made it clear that the United States would not pressure 
the Bosniacs to accept the Vance-Owen Plan, in the end the United States 
exerted pressure on the Bosniacs to accept it, in large part because it was the 
"only game in town."39 By March 25, 1993, both the Bosniacs and the Bos-
nian Croats had signed it.40 Approximately one and a half months later, the 
Bosnian Serbs announced that they would sign the Vance-Owen Plan pro-
vided that the Bosnian Serb parliament and people agreed.41 The Bosnian 
Serbs held a referendum in Republika Srpska on May 15 and 16, I 993 and 
rejected Vance-Owen. 42 Despite this setback, new negotiations began and 
35 Hastings, supra note 33, at 226. 
36 /d. (describing property laws that made it difficult for minority returnees to claim their pre-
war homes). 
37 DAALDER, supra note 9, at 10; see also DAVID OWEN, BALKAN ODYSSEY 89-149 (1995) 
[hereinafter OWEN]. By the time the Vance-Owen Plan was developed, the international 
community had rejected a three-state solution to the conflict. The London Declaration of 
Principles was inspired by a vision of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a tolerant multiethnic state. 
Consequently Vance and Owen worked to maintain Bosnia and Herzegovina as one state. /d. 
at 37-38. 
38 DAALDER, supra note 9, at 10-11. 
39 /d. at 11-12. 
40 /d. at 11-12. These signings took place days before the Bosnian Serbs had launched the 
now infamous assault on the UN safe area, Srebrenica, which had a predominately Bosniac 
population. !d. at 12. 
41 !d. at 15-16. 
42 !d. at 16; Szasz, supra note 9, at 75-76. 
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the so-called "Invincible Plan" was prepared.43 This plan (named for the 
British carrier where the final negotiations took place) provided a three-
republic solution.44 Bosnia was to be divided into three predominately ethnic 
republics that would be governed by a weak statewide union.45 This time, 
however, it was the Bosniacs who rejected the plan.46 
The next stage of negotiations, led by the United States, resulted in the 
creation of a Bosniac-Bosnian Croat federation within Bosnia. By this time 
the Bosnian Croats had created the Republic of Herceg-Bosna as a Croat 
area and were fighting to maintain it as an independent entity with strong ties 
to the Republic of Croatia ("Croatia"). Consequently, the Bosnian Croats 
were accompanied by representatives from Croatia during the negotiations.47 
The negotiations took place in February and March 1994. The basic frame-
work called for a joint Bosniac-Croat federation consisting of approximately 
half of the Bosnian territory.48 Additionally, the federation would be linked 
to Croatia in an economic confederation.49 The parties ultimately agreed to 
the creation of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (the "Federation") 
on territory that had a pre-war population that was majority Bosniacs and 
Bosnian Croats. 50 While the Bosnian Serbs were not a party to it, the Wash-
ington Agreement, as it would come to be known, created a Bosnian Serb 
entity, the Republika Srpska, within a united Bosnia. 51 The exact boundaries 
of the Federation in relation to the Republika Srpska were left for later nego-
tiations because the Republika Srpska occupied 72% of Bosnia's territory at 
the time and the Bosnian Serbs were not a party to the agreement. 52 
In April 1994, the United States, the Russian Federation, France, Ger-
many, and the United Kingdom formed the Contact Group, in cooperation 
43 Paul C. Szasz, The Quest For a Bosnian Constitution: Legal Aspects of Constitutional Pro-
posals Relating to Bosnia, 19 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 363, 370 (1995); see also Szasz, supra note 
9, at 76. 
44 /d. at 363, 370. 
45 /d. at 370. 
46 The Bosniacs rejected the plan because it only gave them 30% of the Bosnian territory, 
compared to the 36% they would have obtained under the Vance-Owen Plan. MALCOLM, su-
pra note 11, at 370. 
47 Szasz, supra note 9, at 76. 
48 DAALDER,supra note 9, at 27. 
49 /d. 
50 Szasz, supra note 9, at 76. 
51 DAALDER, supra note 9, at 27. 
52 /d. at 28; see also LEONARD J. COHEN, BROKEN BONDS: YUGOSLAVIA'S DISINTEGRATION 
AND BALKAN POLITICS IN TRANSITION 311 ( 1995) [hereinafter COHEN]; Szasz, supra note 9, at 
76. 
Moderating Politics in Post-Conflict States 1 1 
with the ICFY, as a new negotiating forum. The Contact Group developed a 
map for Bosnia in which the Federation would occupy 51% of Bosnia's ter-
ritory and the Republika Srpska would occupy 49%.53 This compromise 
gave the Federation a majority of the territory, yet allowed the Republika 
Srpska to maintain control over significant portions of land that had majority 
Bosniac populations before the war. 54 Despite earlier concerns that the 
Vance-Owen map rewarded ethnic cleansing, U.S. officials came to see the 
51/49 territory split as a "compromise between justice and reality. "55 
The plan was presented to the parties on July 6, 1994. The Contact 
Group gave the parties two weeks to respond on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, 
warning that any party that refused to accept the plan would face punitive 
actions. 56 The Bosnian Serbs were informed that rejection could result in in-
creased sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY)57 and 
the Bosnian Serb area, an extension and strict enforcement of arms-exclusion 
zones around Bosniac safe areas, and possibly a lifting of the arms embargo 
against Bosniacs and Bosnian Croats that had been in place since 1991.58 
The Bosniacs and Bosnian Croats quickly accepted the proposal. The Bos-
nian Serbs, however, waited until the last moment and then added so many 
conditions to their acceptance that it essentially amounted to a rejection. 59 
In December 1994, the Contact Group re-evaluated its position regard-
ing the form of the unitary Bosnian state. It offered to reconsider the consti-
tutional provisions stressing a unified Bosnia60 and the territorial provisions 
of the Contact Group plan. The group was open to considering a loose "un-
53 DAALDER, supra note 9, at 28; COHEN, supra note 52, at 311; Szasz, supra note 9, at 76. 
54 DAALDER, supra note 9, at 28. U.S. envoy Charles Redman noted, however, that "most of 
the major cities are within the Moslem-Croat federation." COHEN, supra note 52, at 311. 
55 DAALDER, supra note 9, at 28. In fact, it has been noted that the "map accepted the de facto 
division of Bosnia, long the aim of the Serbs and a premise of European effort, but antithetical 
to the idea of a multiethnic and territorially intact Bosnia. Its acceptance thus represented a 
major U.S. change of heart." /d. at 30. 
56 DAALDER, supra note 9, at 30. 
57 On April 27, 1992, the Republic of the Federal Yugoslavia was created, comprised of the 
Republic of Serbia and the Republic of Montenegro of the former Yugoslavia. In 2003, the 
state changed its name to the Republic of Serbia and Montenegro. 
58 COHEN, supra note 52, at 311-12. 
59 DAALDER, supra note 9, at 30; Szasz, supra note 9, at 76. 
60 !d. at 100 (noting Lake's suggestions regarding carrots to convince the Bosnian Serbs to 
seriously negotiate); see also CoHEN, supra note 52, at 317. Lord Owen stated in October that 
"constitutional issues were no longer important," which has been interpreted as "hinting that 
Bosnian Serbs' acceptance of the Contact Group map was the main goal, and not whether the 
Bosnian Serbs would remain in Bosnia and Herzegovina over the long haul." Id. 
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ion" between the Federation and the Republika Srpska.61 Despite these con-
cessions, the Bosnian Serbs refused to negotiate on the details of the Contact 
Group plan. Faced with continued Serbian opposition, the Contact Group 
decided to use its leverage over the President of Serbia, Slobodan Milosevic, 
to get the Bosnian Serbs to the negotiating table. Serbia was saddled with 
economic sanctions that Milosevic was anxious to have suspended or 
lifted.62 In February 1995, the Contact Group offered to suspend these sanc-
tions on the condition that Serbia agree to recognize Croatia and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, support the Contact Group's plan, and accept the U.S. plan for 
addressing the continuing problems in Croatia. 63 This offer led to protracted 
negotiations between the Contact Group and Milosevic, which were halted 
by renewed fighting throughout Bosnia in the spring of 1995.64 
Negotiations regarding the Contact Plan stalled for some time, but con-
ditions changed radically by the fall of 1995, causing the Serbs to become 
"eager to get an agreement. "65 Milosevic was keen to bring about the end of 
the sanctions against Serbia and to further Serbia's reintegration into the in-
ternational community.66 The Bosnian Serbs were afraid of losing more terri-
tory, as they had lost almost 20% of the territory they had held since the 
summer of 1992 as a result of NATO air strikes on Bosnian Serb positions 
around Sarajevo in August 1995 and a Croatian-Bosnian ground offensive.67 
Additionally, the Contact Group made both enticing offers and serious 
threats in order to bring the parties to the negotiating table. The next stage 
of negotiations would lead to the conclusion of the Dayton Peace Agree-
ment. Although these negotiations were conducted by the Contact Group, 
they were "under strict U.S. management."68 
61 DAALDER, supra note 9, at 38; see also Szasz, supra note 9, at 76. 
62 DAALDER, supra note 9, at 39. 
63 Id. By early 1995, Croatian President Tudjman found Serb control over the Kraijina, a bor-
der section between Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, unacceptable. The area was being 
"administered" by the UN, but Serb ethnic cleansing campaigns were taking place. President 
Tudjman was anxious to regain control over the area, but the United States negotiated a deal 
in which he would refrain from attacking in exchange for a public meeting with U.S. Vice 
President AI Gore. Id. at 62-63. 
64 !d. at 40. 
65 !d. at 135. See id. at 81-134 for a detailed discussion of military and political events during 
this interim. 
66 !d.; see also RICHARD HOLBROOK£, To END A WAR I 01-02 (1998) [hereinafter 
HOLBROOK£). 
67 !d. 
68 !d. at 102-16 (describing the United States' development of the Bosnia policy that culmi-
nated with the Dayton Peace Agreement, specifically the United States' decision to push for 
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By early September 1995, Bosnia, Serbia,69 and Croatia agreed to send 
their foreign ministers to Geneva to restart the peace negotiations. 70 U.S. of-
ficials produced a set of "Joint Agreed Principles" for Geneva, which used 
the Contact Group plan of 1994 as a starting point.71 These joint principles 
became the Agreement on Basic Principles ("Basic Principles") that the par-
ties approved on September 8, 1995. Pursuant to these principles Bosnia 
would "continue its legal existence with its present borders and continuing 
international recognition."72 The country would be divided into two entities: 
a Croat-Bosniac federation (the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina cre-
ated by the Washington Agreement) and the Republika Srpska.73 The Fed-
eration would have 51% of the territory, and the remaining 49% would go to 
the Republika Srpska. 74 These two entities would hold elections, adhere to 
international human rights standards, and "enable displaced persons to re-
possess their homes or receive just compensation."75 The enforcement of 
new negotiations); see also Szasz, supra note 9, at 76. 
69 In these negotiations, Slobodan Milosevic, the President of the FRY, negotiated on behalf 
of the Bosnian Serbs pursuant to the "Patriarch Paper." This document, witnessed by the 
leader of the Serb Orthodox Church, Patriarch Pavle, created a joint Yugoslav-Republika 
Srpska delegation for all future negotiations headed by President Milosevic. See DAALDER, 
supra note 9, at 128-29; see also HOLBROOKE, supra note 66, at I 05. 
70 HOLBROOK£, supra note 66, at 114-15. The United States secured the agreement of Izetbe-
govic, Tudjman, and Milosevic regarding the Geneva meeting and then notified the other 
members of the Contact Group to get them on board. This irritated some Contact Group 
members, who thought that they should have approved the meeting before it was arranged, 
and that it should have taken place at a UN building instead of the American Mission in Ge-
neva. /d. at 116-17. Such concerns regarding procedure and protocol "were a constant and 
time-consuming subplot of the negotiations." Jd. at 117. Holbrooke notes, however, that if 
the U.S. team had "consulted the Contact Group prior to each action, it would [have been] 
impossible for the negotiations to proceed, let alone succeed. Now that the United States was 
fmally engaged in Bosnia, we could not allow internal Contact Group squabbles to deflect 
us." /d. 
71 Jd. at 121. These principles were agreed upon by all parties before the Geneva meeting as a 
result of meetings between Holbrooke's team, held with Izetbegovic, Tudjman, and Milosevic 
individually. See id. at 120, 129-31. 
72 Agreement on Basic Principles in Geneva, Bosn. and Herz.-Croat.-Fed. Rep. Yugo., Sept. 
8, 1995, art. 2 [hereinafter Basic Principles]; see also HOLBROOKE, supra note 66, at 129. 
73 Basic Principles, supra note 72, at art. 2. 
74 HOLBROOKE, supra note 66, at 121. The Basic Principles further stated that "[ e ]ach entity 
will continue to exist under its present constitution (amended to accommodate these basic 
principles)"; both Entities would have the right to create "parallel special relationships with 
neighboring countries, consistent with the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina''; and to utilize binding arbitration to resolve disputes. Basic Principles, supra 
note 72, at arts. 2.2-2.4. 
75 Basic Principles, supra note 72, at art. 2.4. 
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these human rights protections was entrusted to a Commission for Displaced 
Persons.76 
The foreign ministers met again in New York to further develop the ne-
gotiating principles. This meeting produced the "Further Agreed Basic Prin-
ciples," whicli provided additional details regarding the operation of the cen-
tral Bosnian government. The parties agreed that "free democratic elections 
[would] be held in both Entities as soon as social conditions permit[ed]," as 
determined by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
(OSCE), and that the elections would include contests for a national parlia-
ment or assembly and a three-member presidency.77 Two-thirds of the par-
liament and two of the three seats of the Presidency would be elected from 
the Federation with the remaining one-third of the parliament and final 
presidential seat elected from the Republika Srpska. 78 The parties also 
agreed to create a cabinet of ministers and a Constitutional Court, stating that 
the new institutions would be responsible for Bosnia's foreign policy.79 The 
conclusion of this agreement was seen as an important moment in the nego-
tiations because it demonstrated that the parties were not simply dividing the 
country into separate independent entities, but were also "building a central 
government, at least on paper."80 The principles agreed upon at the meetings 
in Geneva and New York formed the foundation for "proximity talks"81 held 
at Wright-Patterson Air Force base in Dayton, Ohio.82 · 
One issue that was not resolved prior to the proximity talks was the au-
thority of the official responsible for civilian implementation efforts.83 U.S. 
76 See id. at art. 3.1. The parties also agreed to the creation of a Bosnia and Herzegovina Hu-
man Rights Commission to enforce general human rights obligations, joint Bosnia and Herze-
govina public corporations to own and operate public facilities, and a Commission to Preserve 
National Monuments. /d. at arts. 3.2-3.4. 
77 Further Agreed Basic Principles, arts. 5.0, 5.2, 6.1, 6.2 (1995) [hereinafter Further Agreed Ba-
sic Principles), available at http://www.ohr.int/other-doc/contact-g/default.asp?content_id=3526. 
78 Decisions by the Presidency would be based on a majority vote, but if one-third or more of 
the members disagreed with a decision and declared that such decision would be destructive 
to a vital interest of their entity, the matter would be immediately referred to the dissenting 
member's parliament. If the parliament confirmed the dissenting opinion by a two-thirds 
vote, the challenged action would not be taken. /d. at arts. 6.1, 6.2. 
79 /d. at arts. 6.3, 6.4, 6.6. 
80 HOLBROOKE, supra note 66, at 183. 
81 Proximity talks are "a diplomatic technique originating in Mideast negotiations held in the 
1940s at the U.N., in which the mediator moves between the two parties, who rarely meet one 
another face-to-face-a sort of 'shuttle diplomacy by foot."' HOLBROOKE, supra note 66, at 
205. 
82 DAALDER, supra note 9, at 117; see also Szasz, supra note 9, at 75. 
83 DAALDER, supra note 9, at 140; see also HOLBROOKE, supra note 66, at 224. 
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policymakers decided that a senior official would be appointed to "coordi-
nate rather than direct the divergent and sometimes competing efforts of 
multiple international agencies and non-governmental organizations."84 
U.S. officials understood that the civilian effort would involve coordi-
nating continued negotiations with the parties, monitoring human rights, 
economic reconstruction, refugee resettlement, facilitating elections, ad-
dressing war crimes, humanitarian relief, and institution building. 85 While 
international organizations were identified to take the lead on particular is-
sues, the issue of overall coordination still had to be addressed since the UN 
would not be the umbrella organization overseeing the civilian effort. 86 The 
Dayton drafters decided that this role would belong to a "High Representa-
tive" who would be appointed by the Peace Implementation Council (PIC).87 
The UN Security Council would then "bless" the structure rather than im-
plement it.88 The U.S. staff responsible for negotiating the annex on civilian 
84 DAALDER, supra note 9, at 15 3. Daalder identifies two key factors that were critical in the 
development of the civilian implementation structure that affected the early success of the 
Dayton Peace Agreement. First, U.S. officials did not want the UN to have a leading role in 
this effort because of "growing disagreement between its secretary general and the admini-
stration." !d. at 154. Second, the United States insisted that the military operation be under 
the sole command ofNATO, completely separate from the civilian implementation effort. /d. 
This account differs from Ambassador Richard Holbrooke's recollection of relevant events. 
Holbrooke states that the UN Secretary-General was highly interested in disengaging from 
Bosnia. Secretary-General Boutros-Gali informed the Security Council that he was prepared 
to end the UN's role in the former Yugoslavia and told Madeleine Albright that the Contact 
Group would have to create its own civilian implementation mechanisms. Holbrooke com-
ments that Secretary-General Boutros-Gali volunteered "to reduce the UN's role at a critical 
moment," which "simplified [Holbrooke's] task considerably." HOLBROOK£, supra note 66, 
at 174-75. Whatever the reason, the UN was not to play a leadership role in shaping and im-
plementing the civilian efforts in Bosnia. 
85 DAALDER, supra note 9, at 155. 
86 /d. at 156. 
87 The PIC was created in December 1995 as the successor to the ICFY, to oversee the im-
plementation of the Peace Agreement and "create new strategies to fulfill the peace accord's 
goals." Yordan, supra note 2, at 152. The PIC currently has fifty-five members, which in-
clude forty-two states and thirteen agencies/IGOs, including the Council of Europe, the Inter-
national Committee of the Red Cross, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, and the World Bank. See OHR, OHR 
General Information, available at http://www.ohr.int/ohr-info/gen-info/ (last visited Apr. 9, 
2006). The executive arm of the PIC is the Steering Board, which provides political guidance 
to the High Representative. Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United King-
dom, the United States, the Presidency of the European Union, the European Commission, 
and Turkey (as the representative of the Organization of the Islamic Conference) are the 
members of the PIC Steering Board. I d. 
88 DAALDER, supra note 9, at 156. 
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implementation drafted a document that gave the High Representative a 
strong mandate with "direct authority over the international organizations 
that would contribute to the implementation effort. "89 After being briefed on 
the annex, the Contact Group members enthusiastically supported the strong 
mandate. The U.S. team had been under the impression that the High Repre-
sentative was going to be an American. Upon hearing that Holbrooke had 
agreed, pursuant to European insistence,90 that a European, Carl Bildt, would 
be the first High Representative, the team limited the High Representative's 
authority and responsibility. The team was afraid that a stronger mandate in 
the hands of someone outside of Washington's control could ruin the im-
plementation effort and hinder the military endeavor.91 
D. The Substance of the Dayton Peace Agreement 
An agreement premised on the Basic Principles was finally reached on 
November 21, 1995, when the presidents of the FFY, Croatia, and Bosnia 
and Herzegovina initialed a peace agreement.92 The Dayton Peace Agree-
ment, signed in Paris on December 14, 1995, is a treaty that includes twelve 
annexes,93 all of which entered into force automatically upon signature.94 
89 !d. at 157. 
90 Another factor was the need for the Europeans to pay for the civilian effort. In the fall of 
1995, the Clinton Administration and the U.S. Congress were facing "the biggest budget con-
frontation between the two branches in this century." HOLBROOKE, supra note 66, at 174. 
The President had been advised that it would be extremely difficult to get Congress to ap-
prove the use of funds for Bosnia. Consequently, members of Congress told Holbrooke's 
team that the Europeans would have to pay for Bosnia's reconstruction. It was therefore de-
cided that the chief civilian would have to be European. /d. at 174. 
91 DAALDER,supra note 9,at 157. 
92 !d. at 117. 
93 The following are the annexes included in the Dayton Agreement: 
Annex 1-A Agreement on Military Aspects of the Peace Settlement; 
Annex 1-B Agreement on Regional Stabilization; 
Annex 2 Agreement on Inter-Entity Boundary Line and Related Issues; 
Annex 3 Agreement on Elections; 
Annex 4 Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina; 
Annex 5 Agreement on Arbitration; 
Annex 6 Agreement on Human Rights; 
Annex 7 Agreement on Refugees and Displaced Persons; 
Annex 8 Agreement on Commission to Preserve National Monuments; 
Annex 9 Agreement for the Establishment of Bosnia and Herzegovina Public 
Corporations; 
Annex 10 Agreement on Civilian Implementation; 
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The annexes are necessary to address specific issues in detail because the 
main text addresses them only in a general manner. The parties to the an-
nexes are the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and its two Entities: the 
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska.95 
1. Office of the High Representative 
As described above, the responsibility for civilian implementation was 
given to the High Representative. Dayton, however, gave the position a rela-
tively weak mandate. Not only were the civilian and military components of 
Dayton implementation kept completely separate, the OHR was granted no 
explicit authority over the many organizations responsible for various as-
pects of the civilian implementation. The OHR was tasked to 
[ c ]oordinate the activities of the civilian organizations and agencies 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina [in order] to ensure the efficient imple-
mentation of the civilian aspects of the peace settlement. The High 
Representative shall respect their autonomy within their spheres of 
operation while as necessary giving general guidance to them about 
the impact of their activities on the implementation of the peace set-
tlement [and] [f]acilitate ... the resolution of any difficulties arising 
in connection with civilian implementation.96 
This limited mandate prevented the High· Representative from guiding 
the civilian implementation efforts that were undertaken by various interna-
tional organizations and agencies. 97 Before the articulation of the Bonn Pow-
ers,98 this mandate also prevented the High Representative from actively en-
gaging in the implementation of legislation that the OHR and other members 
of the international community deemed necessary for implementing Dayton. 
Annex 11 Agreement on International Police Task Force. 
OHR, The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
available at http://www.ohr.int/dpaldefault.asp?content_id=380 (Dec. 14, 1995). 
94 Szasz, supra note 9, at 75, 77. 
95 !d. at 77. Some of the annexes have additional parties, such as Annex 10, the Agreement 
on Civilian Implementation, which includes the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic 
ofYugoslavia. See General Framework Agreement, supra note 1, at annex 10. 
96 General Framework Agreement, supra note 1, at annex 10, art. 11(1)(c-d) (Agreement on 
Civilian Implementation). 
97 DAALDER,supra note 9, at 159. 
98 See discussion infra Part IV. 
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2. Human Rights: The Return of Refugees and Displaced Persons 
The success of ethnic cleansing during the war resulted in a significant 
number of refugees and displaced persons returning home to their munici-
palities as ethnic minorities, where they had previously been part of the eth-
nic majority. One of the main goals of Dayton was thus to "gain agreement 
for a multi ethnic state. "99 In order to achieve this goal, it was important to 
recognize the rights of those who had been displaced by the conflict and 
their role in the peace process. Article VII of the Dayton Peace Agreement 
expresses this importance by stating that "the observance of human rights 
and the protection of refugees and displaced persons are of vital importance 
in achieving a lasting peace." Annex 7, the Agreement on Refugees and 
Displaced Persons ("Refugee Agreement"), further describes how the rights 
of refugees and displaced persons should be protected.100 
The Refugee Agreement recognizes the importance of the "early return" 
of refugees and displaced persons for the "settlement of conflict in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina."101 Encouraging and supporting minority returnees is one 
means of reversing the development of ethnically homogeneous areas and 
promoting the creation of a multiethnic rather than a divided state compris-
ing three separate ethnic territories. The parties agreed that "[a]ll refugees 
and displaced persons have the right to freely return to their homes of origin" 
and that they also "have the right to have restored to them property of which 
they were deprived in the course of hostilities since 1991 and to be compen-
sated for any property that cannot be restored to them. "102 The agreement en-
sures that the safety of returnees will be protected so that they do not suffer 
"harassment, intimidation, persecution, or discrimination" on account of 
their ethnicity, religion, or political opinion.103 
99 HOLBROOK£, supra note 66, at 232. 
100 General Framework Agreement, supra note I, at art. VII. 
101 General Framework Agreement, supra note I, at annex 7, art. I(I) (Agreement on Refu-
gees and Displaced Persons). 
102 /d. 
103 /d. at annex 7, art. 1(2). Art. II details the obligations the parties undertake to create suit-
able conditions for return. The parties agreed to: 
I .... to create in their territories the political, economic, and social conditions 
conducive to the voluntary return and harmonious reintegration of refugees and 
displaced persons, without preference for any particular group. The Parties shall 
provide all possible assistance to refugees and displaced persons and work to fa-
cilitate their voluntary return in a peaceful, orderly and phased manner, in accor-
dance with the UNHCR repatriation plan. 
2. The Parties shall not discriminate against returning refugees and displaced 
persons with respect to conscription into military service, and shall give positive 
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3. Democracy: The Promotion of Free and Fair Elections 
Democratic ideals are the basis for Bosnia's political system. The Pre-
amble of the Constitution for Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is Annex 4 of 
the Dayton Peace Agreement, proclaims that the constituent peoples of Bos-
nia104 are "[c]onvinced that democratic governmental institutions and fair 
procedures best produce peaceful relations within a pluralist society."105 It 
further states that Bosnia will be a "democratic state, which shall operate un-
der the rule of law and with free and democratic elections." 106 To operation-
alize these goals the constitution calls for two representative governmental 
bodies: the Presidency and the Parliamentary Assembly. 107 The manner in 
which individuals are elected to various positions within these bodies is 
guided by the Agreement on Elections, which is Annex 3 of the Dayton 
Peace Agreement. 
a. Representation in a New Political Structure 
Political representation in Bosnia's political system is based on ethnicity 
consideration to requests for exemption from military or other obligatory service 
based on individual circumstances, so as to enable returnees to rebuild their 
lives. 
/d. at annex 7, art. II. The specific commitments undertaken to actualize these obligations 
include: 
(a) the repeal of domestic legislation and administrative practices with discrimi-
natory intent or effect; 
(b) the prevention and prompt suppression of any written or verbal incitement, 
through media or otherwise, of ethnic or religious hostility or hatred; 
(c) the dissemination, through the media, of warnings against, and the prompt 
suppression of, acts of retribution by military, paramilitary, and police services, 
and by other public officials or private individuals; 
(d) the protection of ethnic and/or minority populations wherever they are found 
and the provision of immediate access to these populations by international hu-
manitarian organizations and monitors; and 
(e) the prosecution, dismissal or transfer, as appropriate, of persons in military, 
paramilitary, and police forces, and other public servants, responsible for serious 
violations of the basic rights of persons belonging to ethnic or minority groups. 
/d. at annex 7, art. l(3)(a)-(e). . 
104 The Constitution identifies Bosniacs, Croats, and Serbs as the constituent peoples and citi-
zens of Bosnia and Herzegovina. /d. at annex 4, preamble (Constitution of Bosnia and Her-
zegovina). 
105 !d. 
106 !d. at annex 4, art. 1(2). 
107 This structure builds upon the Basic Principles agreed upon by the parties in New York on 
September 26, 1995. Further Agreed Basic Principles, supra note 77. 
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and geography. Pursuant to the Constitution, the Presidency consists of 
three Members-a Bosniac, a Bosnian Croat, and a Bosnian Serb---elected 
directly from their respective Entities. 108 The Bosniac and Croat members 
are elected from the Federation while the Serb member is elected from the 
Republika Srpska. 109 Each voter is only allowed to vote for one Presidency 
seat. 110 The Parliamentary Assembly comprises two houses, the House of 
Representatives and the House of Peoples. 111 The House of Representatives 
has forty-two Members, two-thirds elected from the Federation and one-third 
elected from the Republika Srpska.112 Unlike the Presidency, the Constitu-
tion does not impose an ethnic division on the Parliamentary Assembly 
seats, but it does state that the members will be elected from their Entity in 
accordance with "an election law to be adopted by the Parliamentary As-
sembly."113 The House of Peoples has fifteen Delegates, two-thirds from the 
Federation and one-third from the Republika Srpska. 114 Of the ten Delegates 
from the Federation, five must be Bosniacs and five must be Bosnian Croats, 
while the five Delegates from the Republika Srpska must be Bosnian 
Serbs.115 
The above formulation created quotas in order to ensure each ethnic 
group numerically equal representation in the Presidency, the House of Peo-
ples, and possibly the House of Representatives, despite the fact that Bosni-
acs, Bosnian Croats, and Bosnian Serbs did not represent equal percentages 
108 General Framework Agreement, supra note 1, at annex 4 art. V (Constitution of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina). The two regional units of Bosnia, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzego-
vina and the Republika Srpska, are referred to as the two Entities of Bosnia. /d. at annex 4 
art. 1(3). 
109 /d. at annex 4, art. V(l)(a). 
110 /d. at annex 4, art. V{l)(a). 
111 /d. at annex 4, art. V. 
112 /d. at annex 4, art. V(2). 
113 !d. at annex 4, art. IV(2)(a). 
114 !d. at annex 4, art. V{l). 
115 /d. at annex 4, art. IV( I). Federation Delegates are selected by the Bosniac and Croat 
Delegates to the House of Peoples of the Federation while the Republika Srpska Delegates are 
selected by that entity's legislature. /d. at annex 4, art. IV(l){a). This type of system en-
trenches ethnic-based campaigning, voting, and representation because candidates have little 
to no incentive to solicit votes from outside of their ethnic group. With each ethnic group 
guaranteed one representative in the Presidency the only competition is between candidates 
vying for the same ethnic slot. The Constitutional arrangement does not allow for two Fed-
eration members of the Presidency, but one Bosniac and one Bosnian Croat, and each voter 
can only vote to fill one ethnic position (presumably the position corresponding with their 
ethnic identity) in the Presidency. See discussion infra Part V. 
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of the population.116 Despite the secessionist desires of the Bosnian Serb and 
Bosnian Croat leaderships, any peace settlement acceptable to the interna-
tional actors directly involved in the peace negotiations had to maintain Bos-
nia as one state. 117 However, the decentralized nature of the new Bosnian 
state reflected the key to obtaining peace, "managing ethnic antagonisms."118 
The form of representative government agreed upon in Dayton reflects this 
characterization of the conflict. 119 The manner in which the ethnic antago-
nism was managed, however, also reflects the nationalist leaders' desire for 
post-conflict Bosnia to include power structures that they controlled.120 
b. Agreement on Elections 
The OSCE was responsible for developing the detailed guidelines gov-
erning the election process. The Agreement on Elections granted the OSCE 
the authority to supervise the preparation and conduct of elections for the 
federal House of Representatives and the Presidency of Bosnia, the House of 
Representatives and National Assembly for both Entities, and the Presidency 
of the Republika Srpska. 121 The OSCE was also responsible for certifying 
whether elections could be effective under then-existing social conditions 
and, if necessary, for assisting the parties to create the necessary condi-
tions.122 
The Dayton parties anticipated that the first elections would take place 
six to nine months after the Dayton Peace Agreement entered into force. 
They were to be governed by the rules and regulations created by the Provi-
116 In 1991, no ethnic group accounted for a majority of the Bosnian population, as 43.5% de-
clared themselves Bosniac, 32.1% Serb, 17.4% Croat, 5.5% Yugoslav, and 2.4% "other." See 
Elections in Bosnia & Herzegovina, supra note 19, at 2. 
117 See HOLBROOKE, supra note 66, at 279. (Recounting a conversation with Haris Silajdzic, 
in which Holbrooke reminds Silajdzic that that the negotiation and subsequent creation of a 
single country was done at the request of Silajdzic and Izetbegovic.) 
118 VESNA BonCIC-DZELILOVIC, Managing Ethnic Conflicts: Democratic Decentralisation in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, in CAN DEMOCRACY BE DESIGNED? THE POLITICS OF INSTITUTIONAL 
CHOICE IN CONFLICT-TORN SOCIETIES 277, 279-80 (Sunil Bastian & Robin Luckham eds., 
2003) [hereinafter Boncic-DzELILOVIC]. 
119 /d. at 279. "There was an implied acceptance of the existence of deep ethnic divisions 
among BiH's three main ethnic groups around which the new institutional architecture was 
then structured." ld. at 280. 
120 /d. at 279-81. "It is now received wisdom among political scientists that the political elite 
strives for those institutional choices that best fit its own interests." /d. at 281. 
121 General Framework Agreement, supra note l, at annex 3 art. 11(2) (Agreement on Elec-
tions). 
122 /d. at annex 3, art. 1(2). 
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sional Election Commission (PEC), which was also responsible for supervis-
ing all aspects of the electoral process, including establishing voter registra-
tion procedures, ensuring compliance with the established rules and regula-
tions, and accrediting election observers.123 Unlike the civilian 
implementation annex, the Agreement on Elections clearly gave the PEC the 
responsibility of ensuring that "action [be] taken to remedy" violations of the 
Election Agreement or electoral rules and regulations, "including imposing 
penalties against any person or body that violated such provisions."I24 The 
head of the OSCE Mission was designated the Chairman of the PEC and was 
given final decision-making authority in the face of disagreement within the 
PEC.I25 
II. POWER-SHARING IN BOSNIA: THE CONSOCIATIONAL APPROACH 
Through the Dayton Peace Agreement the international community was 
able to realize its goal of maintaining Bosnia as a single political entity by 
utilizing a consensus-based power-sharing political system. Due to the in-
tense ethnic antagonism that developed during the war, however, maintain-
ing Bosnia as a unified state would require a political system in which no 
single ethnic group could be perceived as having more power than another 
group. The American negotiators, in· cooperation with their European coun-
terparts, I26 decided to employ a form of government that is similar to conso-
ciational democracy. This form of democracy has been effective in societies 
with significant political divisions that closely follow lines of social stratifi-
cation like the Netherlands, Belgium, and Switzerland. 127 These political di-
visions, often referred to as social cleavages, can exist along lines of class, 
ethnicity, religion, language, race, or gender.I 28 
The concept of consociational democracy acknowledges that social 
cleavages exist and seeks to create a governing structure in which the nu-
123 I d. at annex 3, arts. III(2)(a-c ), (e). 
124 I d. at annex 3, art. lll(2)( d). 
125 ld. at annex 3, art. III(3). Other members of the PEC included the High Representative, 
representatives of parties to the Dayton Accords, and any other person chosen by the Chair-
man in consultation with the parties. 
126 See, e.g., HOLBROOKE, supra note 66, at 240. 
127 ld. at 1, 31-44. 
128 DEMOCRACY IN PLURAL SOCIETIES, supra note 6, at 3 (1977) (quoting HARRY ECKSTEIN, 
DIVISION AND COHESION IN DEMOCRACY: A STUDY OF NORWAY 34 (1966)). See a/so THE 
BLACKWELL DICTIONARY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 61 (Frank Healey ed., 1999) (defining social 
cleavages as "those divisions in society which are wide (or deep) enough to find political ex-
pression"). 
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merous and often competing interests within the society can be accommo-
dated. Consociational democracy has four elements: participation by repre-
sentatives from each significant segment of society; mutual veto; proportion-
ality in the voting and in the apportionment of public positions; and a high 
degree of autonomy for each segment. 129 A basic element of consociational 
democracy is the existence of a grand coalition. A grand coalition is a gov-
ernment body in which political leaders from each of a society's significant 
segments cooperate to govern the country. 130 A grand coalition can take a 
variety of forms, but the most typical are parliamentary cabinets and advi-
sory committees.131 In order for a grand coalition to be effective, it must 
129 Arend Lijphart, The Power-Sharing Approach, in CONFLICT AND PEACEMAKING IN 
MULTIETHNIC SOCIETIES 494-95 (Joseph V. Montville ed., 1990) [hereinafter The Power-
Sharing Approach]; see also DEMOCRACY IN PLURAL SOCIETIES, supra note 6, at 25; THE 
BLACKWELL DICTIONARY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 83 (Frank Bealey ed., 1999). 
Although the creators of Bosnia's constitution never explicitly identify the form of govern-
ment established as consociational democracy, an examination of the Bosnian system reveals 
that it parallels consociational democracy as outlined by Lijphart. Most importantly, the Bos-
nian constitution accepts that ethnicity is a significant cleavage within Bosnian society and 
political representation is organized around ethnicity. See BOJICIC-DZELILOVIC, supra note 
118. "There was an implied acceptance of the existence of deep ethnic divisions among 
BiH's three main ethnic groups around which the new institutional architecture was then 
structured." !d. at 280. Representatives from each of the three major ethnic groups partici-
pate in the government. The Presidency consists of one Bosniac, one Bosnian Croat, and one 
Bosnian Serb. General Framework Agreement, supra note 1, at annex 4, art. V (Constitution 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina). The House of Peoples similarly grants these three ethnic groups 
equal representation. Each of these groups is given a high degree of autonomy because of the 
decentralization of power, which is concentrated in the Entities. /d. at annex 4, art. III (Con-
stitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina). As a result of the ethnic composition of the Entities, 
the territorial decentralization of power is a de facto decentralization of power along ethnic 
lines. Representation in governmental institutions is not divided proportionally based on the 
size of each ethnic group in Bosnia. Such a division would result in a majority of the political 
power resting with the Bosniacs and leaving the Bosnian Croats as a continual political mi-
nority. See supra notes 25-27 (electoral results would likely be similar to those in the 1990 
elections when Bosnians voted along ethnic lines and the SDA was victorious). Instead, po-
litical representation is split into thirds to ensure that two-thirds of all positions are given to 
individuals from the Federation and one-third to individuals from the Republika Srpska. Of 
the forty-two Members of the House of Representatives, two-thirds are elected from the Fed-
eration and one-third from Republika Srpska. General Framework Agreement, supra note l, 
at annex 4, art. IV(2) (Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina). The Constitutional Court 
utilizes a similar scheme. Of the nine members, four are selected by the Federation's House 
of Representatives and two by the Republika Srpska Assembly. /d. at Art. Vl(l)(a). Finally, 
the Bosnian Constitution provides representatives of the three major ethnic groups with the 
opportunity to veto actions that would harm that groups' vital interest. 
130 See DEMOCRACY rN PLURAL SOCIETIES, supra note 6, at 25. 
131 /d. at 31-36. 
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have representatives from each of the major social groups within the soci-
ety.I32 
Power-sharing arrangements like consociationalism are preferred in 
highly segmented societies in which there is no majority group because they 
enable a significant cross-section of the society to participate in the political 
decision-making process. Broader participation in the decision-making 
process decreases the likelihood that decisions detrimental to the interests of 
the various segments will be made. Arend Lijphart has identified seven fac-
tors that make it more likely that a consociational democratic form of gov-
ernment will work. Consociational democracy is more likely to be success-
ful when the state: (1) does not have a majority ethnic group; (2) does not 
have large socioeconomic differences among the ethnic groups; (3) has eth-
nic groups that are roughly the same size; (4) has a limited number of 
groups; (5) has a total population that is relatively small; (6) has external 
dangers that promote internal unity; (7) and has a prior tradition of compro-
mise and accommodation. 133 Additionally, the political elites must have 
overarching loyalties134 that reduce the strength of particularistic ethnic loy-
alties. The existence of such loyalties enables the political elites to "under-
stand the perils of political fragmentation" and commit to maintaining the 
existing political system and improving its cohesion and stability. 135 Conse-
quently political elites are able to transcend the social cleavages to work 
with the elites of the rival social segments with the purpose, according to Li-
jphart, of "accommodat[ing] the divergent interests and demands of the sub-
cultures."136 
In the context of Bosnia, such overarching loyalties did not exist among 
the political elites in the early post-war years. The extreme nationalist par-
ties had risen to power and maintained that power by extolling the dangers of 
ethnic integration and the need for ethnic separation. Equality, democracy, 
justice, tolerance, and reconciliation were supported, but only as long as they 
were implemented within a "separate but equal" context. 137 Each nationalist 
132 Id. at 31-36. 
133 The Power-Sharing Approach, supra note 129, at 497-98. 
134 Overarching loyalties refer to cohesive forces within a society. For example, class repre-
sents a significant cleavage within American society; however, nationality can be an over-
arching loyalty. Regardless of whether one is working class or upper-middle class, one is still 
American and can relate to other members of American society as Americans. See 
DEMOCRACY IN PLURAL SOCIETIES, supra note 6, at 81-83. 
135 Consociational Democracy, supra note 4, at 79. 
136 Id. at 79. 
137 See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (stating United 
States' Supreme Court decision holding Louisiana law requiring "separate but equal" railway 
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party had unfettered control within their respective portion of the Bosnian 
territory and thus there was no incentive to unify the various administrations 
within a central state government. 138 There was also little or no interest in 
facilitating the return of refugees or displaced persons. 
III. POLITICAL OPPOSITION TO RETURN 
One of the most important elements of maintaining a lasting peace in 
Bosnia was to ensure the return and reintegration of the approximately 2.2 
million individuals displaced during the war. The displacement of these in-
dividuals not only caused many people to lose their pre-war homes, it drasti-
cally changed the ethnic demographics of municipalities throughout the for-
mer Yugoslavia. 139 One of the greatest challenges, particularly for minority 
returnees, has been the reclamation of their property after the war ended, de-
spite the assurances provided for in the Refugee Agreement. 140 Many of 
these challenges were created expressly by the Bosnian political elites who 
were interested in solidifying the post-war ethnic demographics throughout 
the country in complete contravention of the Refugee Agreement. 
During the war the governing authorities in each of Bosnia's three war-
time republics enacted property laws that privileged wartime residents over 
pre-war owners and residents. In 1992 and 1993 the Republic of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina authorities enacted the Law on Temporary Abandoned Real 
Property Owned by Citizens141 and the Law on Abandoned Apartments. 
These laws enabled the authorities to classify property as abandoned after 
accommodations for white and black passengers violated the U.S. Constitution). 
138 80JICIC-DZELILOVIC, supra note 118, at 281-82 (noting the SDS, HDZ BiH, and SDA "had 
little genuine interest in the political compromise needed to rebuild the state of BiH on new 
foundations- or, indeed, to support democratic procedures."). 
139 Int'l Crisis Group, Going Nowhere Fast: Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (ICG Bosnia Report No. 23) at 9 (May 1, 1997) (noting the war 
caused 1.2 million people to become refugees and displaced 1.0 million throughout Bosnia) 
[hereinafter Going Nowhere Fast]. 
140 /d. at 33-40 (describing problems unique to minority returnees such as violence against 
minorities, ethnic engineering to control the ethnic demographics of resettled areas, and media 
propaganda against reintegration). 
141 In former Yugoslavia property was owned socially and privately. Social property was 
owned by "society as a whole," but was generally registered to municipalities or state-owned 
companies. Hastings, supra note 33, at 225. These entities were known as the "allocation 
right holders." /d. The registered owners typically provided the socially-owned housing to 
their employees, who obtained "occupancy rights." !d. Occupancy rights were generally 
granted for indefinite periods of time, and they passed onto another member of the household 
upon the death of the individual who possessed the occupancy rights. /d. at 225-26. 
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April 30, 1991, the date the war with Croatia started and population move-
ments began. 142 Once properties were classified as abandoned, the authori-
ties could assign them to someone other than the pre-war occupant for up to 
one year after the end of the "direct war danger."143 The Law on Abandoned 
Apartments was amended in 1995, allowing authorities to declare a property 
permanently abandoned if the pre-war holder of the occupancy rights did not 
return to the property within seven days (fifteen days if living abroad) of the 
end of war. 144 Government officials adopted procedures to govern the distri-
bution of abandoned property, but they were rarely followed. Authorities 
often assigned property based on political and ethnic affiliations. 145 In the 
Republic ofHerceg-Bosna similar laws existed, 146 but the pre-war occupants 
or owners did not have to return to their property within a specified time-
frame to avoid having the property deemed permanently abandoned. 147 
The situation in the Republika Srpska was different because the munici-
palities, rather than the Republic, regulated property redistribution. It was 
not until 1996 that the authorities for the central Republic regulated the 
process. In that year the Law on the Use of Deserted Property of the Repub-
lika Srpska was enacted. This law allowed all property to be classified as 
abandoned if it had been deserted by the owners or occupants. A new occu-
pant could use abandoned property indefinitely. The law allowed pre-war 
owners or occupants to reclaim their property, and, as with the law in the 
Republic of Herceg-Bosna, there was no time limit for doing so. The prop-
erty would not be turned over to the pre-war owner or occupant, however, 
until the current occupant, usually a Serb, had returned to their pre-war 
property or had been compensated for such property. 148 
In 1997, the Human Rights Ombudsperson 149 held that the property laws 
142 /d. at 226. 
143 /d. 
144 The president of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Alija Izetbegovic, proclaimed 
December 22, 1995, as the day the war ended, which gave displaced persons until December 
29, 1995, and refugees until January 6, 1996, to return to their pre-war properties. /d. at 226-
27. 
145 !d. at 226. 
146 The relevant law in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina was the Decree on the Use of 
Abandoned Apartments, which was enacted in 1993. !d. at 227. 
147 !d. 
148 /d. 
149 The Human Rights Ombudsperson is one of the constituent bodies of the Human Rights 
Commission established in the Dayton Accords. See General Framework Agreement, supra 
note 1, at annex 6, art. 11(1) (Agreement on Human Rights) ("To assist in honoring their obli-
gations under this Agreement, the Parties hereby establish a Commission on Human Rights 
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in both Entities violated the European Convention for the Protection of Hu-
man Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR).150 One year later the Hu-
man Rights Chamber made a similar ruling. 151 Because the Entities commit-
ted themselves to upholding the ECHR and its protocols in the Dayton Peace 
Agreement, 152 the property laws in both Entities had to be revised. Before 
these decisions were issued, Bosnian authorities had promised to revise the 
property laws to ensure an equitable process that would enable pre-war oc-
cupants to reclaim their property and return to their homes. 153 Yet action to 
implement these promises did not materialize. 
To address this problem, the OHR drafted new property legislation with 
the help of Bosnian experts and international organizations.154 As the civilian 
administrator in Bosnia, the High Representative is responsible for coordi-
nating "the activities of the civilian organizations and agencies in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina to ensure the efficient implementation of the civilian aspects of 
the peace settlement" and, as necessary, to give "general guidance to them 
about the impact of their activities on the implementation of the peace set-
tlement."155 Additionally, as the High Representative "judges necessary," he 
shall facilitate the "resolution of any difficulties arising in connection with 
civilian implementation."156 In exercising these duties, the High Representa-
tive sent draft property legislation to the Entities on May 29, 1997.157 The 
(the 'Commission'). The Commission shall consist of two parts: the Office of the Ombuds-
man and the Human Rights Chamber." !d.) 
150 Hastings, supra note 33, at 228. 
151 !d. (noting that both bodies found that the Entity laws violated Articles 1 and 8 of the 
ECHR, which respectively protect the right to peaceful enjoyment of possessions and family 
life and home). 
152 General Framework Agreement, supra note 1, at annex 6, art. I (Agreement on Human 
Rights). 
153 Hastings, supra note 33, at 228. 
154 !d. at 228-29. The revised legislation "declared the wartime laws void, allowed prewar 
occupants to reclaim their homes, and required municipalities to provide alternative accom-
modations to those who would have to vacate apartments reclaimed by prewar occupants. " 
!d. 
155 General Framework Agreement, supra note 1, at annex 10, art. II(l)(c) (Agreement on Ci-
vilian Implementation). 
156 !d. at annex 10, art. Il(l)(d). 
157 Hastings, supra note 33, at 228. The legislation for the Federation consisted of three draft 
laws: the Law on the Cessation of the Application of the Law on Abandoned Properties, the 
Law on the Cessation of the Application of the Law on Temporary and Abandoned Real 
Property Owned by Citizens, and the Law on Taking over the Law on Housing Relations. 
The draft legislation for Republika Srpska was the Law on the Cessation of Application of the 
Law on the Use of Abandoned Property. 
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PIC exerted additional pressure to encourage the Entities to adopt the revised 
legislation "in order to make the full implementation of Annex 7 of the 
Peace Agreement possible," stating that "[i]ntemational support for housing 
reconstruction should be conditional upon fulfillment of these obliga-
tions."158 
The Federation initially agreed on August 6, 1997 to implement the 
property legislation by September 30, 1997.159 By early 1998, however, the 
Federation had yet to adopt the revised legislation.160 On February 3, 1998 
the Sarajevo cantonal authorities adopted the Sarajevo Declaration in which 
they agreed to implement the ORR-drafted laws by March 1, 1998.161 Al-
though the Federation did not meet this deadline, a combination of interna-
tional pressure and negotiations between the Federation, the ORR, and the 
UNHCR, resulted in the passage of the draft laws, which came into force on 
April 4, 1998.162 This was approximately one year after the High Represen-
tative presented the draft legislation to government officials. The new prop-
erty laws declared the wartime laws void, provided the owners or occupants 
of abandoned property the right to file a claim for the return of their prop-
erty, and established a procedure for processing such claims.163 
158 Id. at 229. 
159 Federation Forum, Chairman's Conclusions (Aug. 20, 1997), at http://www.ohr.int/other-
doc/fed-mtng/default.asp?content_id=3622 (last visited Apr. 9, 2006); see also Hastings, su-
pra note 33, at 229. 
160 Hastings, supra note 33, at 229. 
161 Id. The Sarajevo Declaration noted that: 
Sarajevo should lead the country by example by taking the concrete steps set forth in this 
Declaration to enable the return of at least 20,000 minority pre-war residents in 1998, as proof 
of its determination to act as a model for reconciliation, multiethnicity, freedom of movement 
and the unconditional right to return throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
Sarajevo Return Conference, Sarajevo Declaration, Sarajevo, available at 
http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/rrtf/key-docs/sa-docs/default.asp?content_id=5453 (Feb. 3, 
1998). 
162 International assistance to Sarajevo was conditioned upon fulfilling the "benchmarks set 
out in this Declaration and on adequate progress toward meeting the 1998 goal of at least 
20,000 minority returns." Hastings, supra note 33, at 229-230. 
163 Law on the Cessation of the Application of the Law on Temporary Abandoned Real Prop-
erty Owned by Citizens, OFFICIAL GAZETTE R1BH, nos. ll/93 and 13/94 (July 17, 1999) 
[hereinafter Law on Abandoned Real Property], available at 
http://www.ohr.int/decisions/plipdec/default.asp?content_id=249. In the Federation, claim-
ants were to file their claims with the relevant municipal authority, which would issue a deci-
sion no later than thirty days after the claim was filed. Claims related to real property were to 
be filed with the "competent municipal, city or cantonal administrative body competent for 
property-law affairs." !d. at arts. 6, II, 12. Individuals with claims for apartments were to 
apply to the "municipal administrative authority competent for house affairs, unless otherwise 
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The return of apartments proved to be politically chaotic. The new Law 
on Abandoned Apartments granted the current occupant of an apartment a 
minimum 90-day grace period in which to vacate the apartment after a deci-
sion had been issued. 164 Yet the law also required the temporary user to refer 
determined by cantonal law ... [who] shall decide on the claim by a decision within 30 days 
from the date of receipt of the claim." Law on the Cessation of the Application of the Law on 
Abandoned Apartments, OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF RBH no. 6/92, 8/92, 16/92, 13/94, 36/94, 9/95 
and 33/95, at arts. 4, 6 (July 1, 1999) [hereinafter Law on Abandoned Apartments], available 
at http://www.ohr.int/decisions/plipdec/default.asp?content_id=248. 
While there was no deadline for filing claims for real property, claims for abandoned apart-
ments had to be filed within fifteen months from the date the law entered into force. Law on 
Abandoned Real Property, supra, at art. 11; Law on Abandoned Apartments, supra, at art. 5. 
Once a claimant received a decision requiring the return of his/her real property, the law gave 
the temporary user of real property a minimum of ninety days to vacate the property and the 
temporary user of an abandoned apartment a maximum of ninety days to vacate the apart-
ment. Law on Abandoned Real Property, supra, at art. 12; Law on Abandoned Apartments, 
supra, at art. 7a. In exceptional cases, the law provided that this deadline could be extended 
to one year if the municipality responsible for securing alternative accommodation certified to 
the Federation Ministry of Urban Planning and Environment that there was an absence of 
such accommodation in the municipality. Law on Abandoned Real Property, supra, at art. 12 
(the High Representative amended this article to require High Representative-approval of any 
deadline extensions); Law on Abandoned Apartments, supra, at art 7a. 
Republika Srpska (RS) enacted the Law on the Cessation of the Application of the Law 
on the Use of Abandoned Property on December 19, 1998. The RS law resembled the Fed-
eration laws, but it contained several articles that had not been agreed upon by the interna-
tional community. While the Federation law required municipal authorities to provide alter-
native accommodation for certain temporary users, the law in the Republika Srpska stated that 
current occupants could not be forcibly evicted until they could return to their pre-war resi-
dences. Law on the Cessation of the Application of the Law on the Use of Abandoned Prop-
erty, OFFICIAL GAZETIE OF RS, no. 38/1998 (Dec. 11, 1998), art. 6(2) [hereinafter RS Law on 
Abandoned Property], available at http://www.ohr.int/ohr-deptlhr-roVproperty/rs-prop-
leg!laws/default.asp?content_id=5922. Additional obstacles included the lack of a mecha-
nism for initiating evictions and the ability for appeals to delay the implementation of deci-
sions. Hastings, supra note 33, at 230. The Federation law provided that "[a]n appeal shall 
not suspend the execution of the decision" and the Republika Srpska law provided no similar 
protection. Law on Abandoned Real Property, supra, at art. 13(3); Law on Abandoned 
Apartments, supra, at art. 8(3); RS Law on Abandoned Property, supra, at art. 27 ("A deci-
sion on repossession of real property may be appealed with the Ministry of Refugees and Dis-
placed Persons within 15 days from the date of the receipt of the decision."). 
164 Law on Abandoned Apartments, supra note 163, at art. 7. This provision was suspended 
by the High Representative. See High Representative, Decision suspending decision-making 
on claims to apartments in the Federation for which a permanent occupancy right was issued 
after April 30, 1991, and imposing a moratorium on sale of apartments to persons who ac-
quired their occupancy right after April 30, 1991 (Nov. 5, 1998), available at 
http://www.ohr.int/decisions/plipdec/default.asp?content_id= 151 [hereinafter High Represen-
tative]. 
30 lOUCLAJ. INT'LL. &FOREIGN AFF. 1 (2005) 
the case to the relevant cantonal (provincial) authority for a decision regard-
ing the provision of alternative accommodation.165 This was an effort to bal-
ance the property rights of the current occupant, which had been acquired 
during the war, with those of the pre-war occupant. To implement this 
clause, the Federation's Ministry of Urban Planning and the Environment 
issued an instruction establishing criteria for determining whose rights pre-
vailed. 166 The criteria, such as the number of household members, were to be 
evaluated during a special hearing. 167 The High Representative realized the 
potential this process could have for prolonging, and perhaps preventing al-
together, the return of property to pre-war owners. To prevent such an ob-
struction of the Refugee Agreement, the High Representative suspended the 
application of Article 3(6) of the Law on the Cessation of the Application of 
the Law on Abandoned Apartments and sought an expert opinion from the 
Council of Europe regarding the instruction's compatibility with the 
ECHR.168 The Council of Europe concluded that the decision-making criteria 
created by the Federation could not be issued in an instruction, so the High 
Representative revoked Article 3(6).169 
The revocation of Article 3(6) eliminated the legal contest for superior 
rights to occupy an apartment. As a result, once the relevant municipal au-
thority issued a decision regarding a claim for the return of an apartment, the 
current occupant had to vacate. This development did not, however, address 
the right of current occupants to alternative accommodation. Article 3(5) of 
the Law on the Cessation of the Application of the Law on Abandoned 
Apartments states that a temporary user who is required to vacate an apart-
165 This referral was to take place within thirty days after the Article 6 decision and the can-
tonal authority had to issue a decision within thirty days of the case being submitted to it. 
Law on Abandoned Apartments, supra note 163, at art. 3(6) (suspended by High Representa-
tive, supra note 164). 
166 For example, the pre-war occupant would be allowed to return to the property if"the num-
ber of the family household members of the (prewar) occupancy right holder exceeds three 
fourths of the number of the family household members of the current occupant." Hastings, 
supra note 33, at 236 (quoting Instructions on the Criteria for the Allocation of Another 
Apartment to Holder of Occupancy Right or Current Occupant, FBH Official Gazette, No. 
40/98 (1998)). 
167 !d. 
168 High Representative, supra note 164. This decision was revoked after the Council of 
Europe issued its opinion Hastings, supra note 33, at 237. 
169 See Hastings, supra note 33, at 236-37; see also High Representative, supra note 164. Be-
fore revoking Article 3(6), the High Representative revoked his 5 November 1998 Decision 
suspending application of Article 3(6). High Representative, Decision revoking the decision 
of 5 November 1998 (Apr. 14, 1999), available at 
http://www.ohr.int/decisions/plipdec/default.asp?content_id= 157. 
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ment and "whose housing needs are not otherwise met, shall be provided 
with accommodation in accordance with the ZOSO [Law on Taking over the 
Law on Housing Relations] by the administrative body on the territory of 
which she/he had his/her latest domicile or residence. "170 Municipal authori-
ties often cited a lack of alternative accommodation as the reason current oc-
cupants could not be evicted. 171 Viewing this as another effort to obstruct the 
return of displaced persons and refugees, the High Representative amended 
the law on October 27, 1999 to clarify which individuals were entitled to al-
ternative accommodation. 172 
The High Representative's Decision, which amended the Law on Aban-
doned Apartments, stated that current occupants were not entitled to alterna-
tive accommodation if they (I) had a legal right to return to their pre-war 
home, (2) that the home was "sufficiently intact to provide for basic living 
conditions (protection against weather; water installations and sanitary fit-
tings to an appropriate level; electricity; heating; privacy; and security of be-
longings)," and (3) could return to such property in "safety and dignity."173 
Additionally, current occupants, whose pre-war residence was occupied by a 
member of the 1991 household; or who had a 1991 household member living 
in the same municipality who was also ineligible for alternative accommoda-
tion; or who voluntarily sold or exchanged their April 30, 1991 property 
were not entitled to alternative accommodation. 174 Furthermore, any tempo-
rary user who refused alternative accommodation or assistance for the recon-
struction of their April 30, 1991 residence did not have a right to alternative 
accommodation. 175 
Once it became evident that there was an imminent need to evict current 
occupants, the High Representative had to address local officials' refusal to 
execute evictions. Evictions are often a sensitive task because they can re-
quire officials to evict individuals of their own ethnicity to allow the pre-war 
owners, often members of a different ethnic group, to repossess the property. 
Various actions were taken by international organizations active in the civil-
ian implementation of Dayton to address this obstacle. For example, the In-
ternational Police Task Force, in consultation with the OSCE, advised the 
170 Law on Abandoned Apartments, supra note 163, at art. 3(6). 
171 Hastings, supra note 33, at 244. 
172 High Representative, Decision on the Instruction on Application of the Law on Cessation 
of Application of the Law on Abandoned Apartments in its amended form, at arts. 26-36 (Oct. 
27, 1999), available at http://www.ohr.int/decisions/plipdec/default.asp?content_id= 180. 
173 Id. at art. 30. 
174 !d. at arts. 31-32. 
175 !d. at art. 33. 
32 10 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 1 (2005) 
Bosnian Minister of Interior that failing to assist in lawful evictions would 
constitute non-compliance with Dayton, which could cause a police officer 
to be decertified. 176 When legislative action by the National Assembly in the 
Republika Srpska suspended evictions from November 1, 1999, to April 1, 
2000, the High Representative responded that the action was inconsistent 
with his October 27, 1999 Decisions, and therefore was null and void. 177 
Despite various amendments to the property laws in both Entities, local 
officials continued to obstruct the implementation of the revised laws im-
posed by the High Representative. In the Federation, housing authorities re-
sponsible for processing claims for the return of pre-war property charged 
fees that were not provided for in the property legislation.178 Some housing 
authorities refused to accept claims, while others referred claimants to bodies 
that were not authorized to process such claims. 179 At the outer extreme, 
some municipalities simply refused to establish housing authorities, thus de-
nying claimants a place to file their claims.180 Similar tactics were utilized in 
the Republika Srpska. A problem unique to the Republika Srpska, however, 
was insufficient resources, which prevented the processing of claims. Due to 
a lack of ink cartridges, envelopes, and stamps, Republika Srpska officials 
stated that there was no point in issuing decisions since they could not be 
printed and mailed. 181 
Other examples of obstructionist behavior included: illegally reallocat-
ing vacated apartments; deliberately providing claimants with inaccurate in-
formation regarding the claims process; requiring claimants to provide addi-
tional documentation in contravention of the property law; failing to 
establish the necessary offices and commissions to process property claims; 
failing to process, examine, or decide filed claims; only deciding claims in 
favor of majority returnees; limiting municipal Ministry of Refugee officers' 
access to the necessary information regarding socially-owned apartments; 
creating parallel institutions to delay or prevent evictions; and failing to issue 
eviction notices and canceling scheduled evictions.182 Officials also blocked 
176 Hastings, supra note 33, at 240. 
177 High Representative, Decision Annulling the RSNA Conclusion Proclaiming a Winter Ban 
on Evictions (Nov. 16, 1999), available at http://www.ohr.int/decisions/plipdec/default.asp? 
content_id=206. 
178 The fees ranged from ten to one hundred Konvertible Marka (KM) when the average 
monthly income in the Federation was 319 KM and 128 in the Republika Srpska. Hastings, 
supra note 33, at 231. 
179 !d. at 231-32. 
180 !d. at 232. 
181 !d. 
182 See High Representative, Removals and Suspensions from Office (Nov. 29, 1999), avail-
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reconstruction projects, issued letters limiting returnees' land use, made in-
flammatory and offensive public statements, obstructed the work of the Hu-
man Rights Chamber, 183 refused to implement Human Rights Chamber deci-
sions, 184 hindered the development of transparent municipal authorities, 185 
refused to implement instructions from the High Representative regarding 
educational facilities for minority returnee children, and discriminated 
against minority officials with regard to their remuneration and integra-
tion.186 
The High Representative addressed the obstruction by removing or sus-
pending government officials pursuant to the Bonn Powers.187 On November 
29, 1999, the High Representative removed nineteen officials-the largest 
number of officials in one day-for obstructing the implementation of the 
Dayton Peace Agreement, specifically the provisions providing for the return 
of displaced persons and refugees. 188 The fact that fifteen of these officials 
had been democratically elected prompted criticism that that the High Rep-
resentative's actions were undemocratic. 189 One commentator involved in 
the implementation of the property laws in Bosnia and Herzegovina has 
noted, however, that most of the international community agreed with the 
High Representative's decision "because it was more harmful to allow the 
able at http://www.ohr.int/decisions/removalssdec/archive.asp?m=&yr=1999. 
183 The Office of the High Representative concluded that Djordje Umicevic, President of the 
Municipal Assembly of Banja Luka, had pressured the proprietors of venues for the hearing in 
Case No. CH/96/29, Islamic Community v. the Republika Srpska, such that it had to be post-
poned four times. Decision removing Mr. Djordje Umicevic from his position of President of 
the Municipal Assembly of Banja Luka (Nov. 29, 1999), available at 
http://www.ohr.int/decisions/removalssdec/default.asp?contenUd=290. 
184 The Human Rights Chamber ordered that Banja Luka grant permission for the construction 
of seven mosques, but local officials refused to grant such permission citing local legislation 
enacted after the relevant Human Rights Chamber decision. Decision removing Mr. Djordje 
Umicevic from his position of President of the Municipal Assembly of Banja Luka (Nov. 29, 
1999), available at http://www.ohr.int/decisions/removalssdec/default.asp?content_id=290. 
185 Decision removing Mr. Elvedin Hrelja from his position of Mayor of Goradze (Nov. 29, 
1999), available at http://www.ohr.int/decisions/removalssdec/default.asp?content_id=277. 
186 See OHR, Removals and Suspensions from Office (Nov. 29, 1999), available at 
http://www.ohr.int/decisions/removalssdec/archive.asp. 
187 See discussion infra Part IV. 
188 See OHR, Removals and Suspensions from Office (Nov. 29, 1999), available at 
http://www.ohr.int/decisions/removalssdeclarchive.asp; see also Hastings, supra note 33, at 
245. It has been noted that this move was intended to "shake up the nationalist power struc-
tures and increase momentum in the peace process." European Stability Initiative, Reshaping 
International Priorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Part II International Power in Bosnia 
(Mar. 30, 2000) 33-35, available at http://www.esiweb.org/pdf/esi_document_id_8.pdf. 
189 Hastings, supra note 33, at 245. 
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Bosnian authorities to hide behind the principles of democracy in order to 
ultimately circumvent them than for the international community to tempo-
rarily circumvent them in order to achieve lasting democracy."190 
Despite the enactment of the new property legislation, the return of 
refugees and displaced persons continued to take place at a level that was 
unacceptably low to the OHR and other international organizations involved 
in facilitating return. While Dayton dashed the hopes held by the HDZ in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and the SDS to obtain territory for a monoethnic 
state, the parties succeeded in obtaining political control over distinct en-
claves within Bosnia--a de facto separation or secession. Within these terri-
tories the parties worked to achieve and maintain ethnic exclusivity. In Sep-
tember 1996, then-Republika Srpska Entity President Biljana Plavsic stated: 
It is not our obligation to think about the Bosniac and Croat dis-
placed persons living in the Federation. We have to solve the prob-
lem of space for our own Serb displaced persons first. They have 
been forced to abandon their own property in the Federation, which 
has belonged to them for centuries. This means that in the near fu-
ture I cannot see any chance for the return of minorities to the Re-
publika Srpska. In this sense, Dayton is more theory than anything 
else.191 
Amnesty International also reported that the Bosnian-Croat authorities 
frequently resisted the return of Bosniacs and did not consistently support 
the return of Bosnian Croats to the Republika Srpska or Bosniac-controlled 
areas in the Federation. 192 In addition to discouraging minority returns, offi-
cials also engaged in ethnic engineering to solidify the ethnic demographics 
of the relevant enclaves. Displaced persons and refugees of the majority 
ethnic group were encouraged to resettle in particular areas that had been 
formerly inhabited by individuals of another ethnic group.193 They were also 
discouraged from returning to areas that were controlled by nationalist par-
ties that did not correspond with their ethnicity. For example, the Bosnian 
Serb leadership in Pale, the wartime capital of the Republika Srpska, waged 
an intimidation campaign to frighten Bosnian Serbs living in the suburbs of 
190 /d. 
191 Going Nowhere Fast, supra note 139 at 34. 
192 Amnesty Int'l, "Who's living in my house?" Obstacles to the safe return of refogees and 
internally displaced people (AI Index: EUR 63/001/1997) (Mar. 19, 1997) at 8, available at 
http://web.amnesty .org/library/pdf/EUR6300 I 1 997ENGLISW$File/EUR6300197 .pdf [here-
inafter "Who's Living in my house? "]. 
193 Efforts to settle areas with members of the majority ethnic group were also used during the 
voter registration process in 1996. See discussion infra Part V(A)( 1 ). 
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Sarajevo to encourage them to move to the Republika Srpska. The cam-
paign--involving violence, the burning of Bosnian Serb homes, and propa-
ganda broadcasts on Pale radio and television-was successful. An esti-
mated 80,000 Bosnian Serbs left their homes after the Bosniacs assumed 
control over the area in February and March of 1996.194 Bosniac authorities 
successfully worked to settle the abandoned areas with Bosniacs displaced 
from the eastern part of the country, specifically Srebrenica. 195 Furthermore, 
Bosnian Croat leaders did not push their Bosniac counterparts to support 
Bosnian Croat return to Bosniac-controlled areas and Bosniac leaders simi-
larly did not help Bosniacs return to pre-war residences that were located in 
Bosnian Croat-controlled areas. 196 Thus there appears to have been implicit, 
if not explicit, collusion among the nationalist party elites to hinder returns 
that would upset the desired ethnic demographics in their respective territo-
nes. 
In conjunction with hindering returns, the extreme nationalist parties 
continued to cultivate ethnic division. In the early post-Dayton years, the 
OHR was the only institution involved in Bosnian politics working to re-
verse the effects of ethnic cleansing. The OHR was also alone in its advo-
cacy for a cohesive multiethnic Bosnian state based on a common Bosnian 
identity and the values of equality, democracy, justice, tolerance, and recon-
ciliation.197 Throughout these early post-war years, the people of Bosnia re-
ceived conflicting messages regarding their identity as citizens of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. They were constantly reminded by democratically-elected 
government officials that they were Bosniacs, Croats, or Serbs, whereas 
OHR officials and other members of the international community reinforced 
every individual's identity as a citizen of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 198 This 
contradiction in messages hindered the development of overarching loyalties 
among the Bosnian people. Despite the work of the nationalist leaders to re-
194 Going Nowhere Fast, supra note 139, at 36. It is also possible that the large exodus of 
Bosnian Serbs was caused by pressure from Bosniacs within the Federation rather than Bos-
nian Serb tactics in Pale. 
195 !d. at 36-37. 
196 !d. at 37. 
197 See, e.g., Int'l Crisis Group, Whither Bosnia? (ICG Bosnia Report No. 4) at 9 (Sept. 9, 
1998), available at http://www .crisisgroup.orglhome/index.cfm?l= l&id= 1513. 
198 See, e.g., Arma Hadziosmanovic, Bosnian Election Campaign "The Dirtiest," AGENCE 
FRANCE-PRESSE, Nov. 5, 2000 [hereinafter Hadziosmanovic] (describing election advertise-
ments reinforcing ethnic identity); see also OHR, Speech by the High Representative at the 
Inaugural Session of the House of Representatives of BiH (Oct. 5, 1995), available at 
http://www. o hr. inti ohr -dept/presso/presssp/ default. asp? content_id =3 28 7 (reminding Bosnian 
legislators that they are united in being citizens of Bosnia). 
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inforce ethnic identities, the OHR continued to work to return Bosnia to an 
ethnically integrated state. The OHR believed that achieving this goal re-
quired the unilateral revision of Bosnian laws and the removal of govern-
ment officials. 
IV. "EXPANDED" AUTHORITY FOR THE HIGH REPRESENTATIVE 
Before the High Representative could embark on a course of action that 
included enacting new laws and removing officials, he had to clarify that 
such action was within the OHR's authority pursuant to Annex 10 of the 
Dayton Peace Agreement. Carlos Westendorp, who became the High Rep-
resentative in 1997, sought such clarification from the PIC. The PIC sought 
to "reinvigorate the implementation effort" at the June 1997 meeting in Sin-
tra, Portugal because it was frustrated by the slow pace at which Dayton was 
being implemented and the low levels of cooperation between the various 
ethnic groups. 199 The PIC Declaration made in Sintra, noted that all Bosnian 
authorities had failed to satisfy their Dayton obligations and concluded that 
such failures were unacceptable.200 The PIC demanded "a significant accel-
eration" in the work of government officials and established firm deadlines 
for the accomplishment of specific goals. 201 The Declaration made clear that 
failure to meet the deadlines would lead to further action by the PIC.202 
In late 1997, the PIC followed through on its threat. During the Decem-
ber meeting in Bonn, Germany, the PIC was faced with the fact that the 
Bosnian government officials had made little progress in the areas addressed 
in the Sintra Declaration. In response, the PIC indicated its willingness to 
see the High Representative exercise his "final authority in theater regarding 
interpretation of [the Agreement] on the civilian implementation of the peace 
settlement."203 The PIC welcomed Westendorp's intention to implement leg-
islation when the Bosnian government did not or would not do so, and to 
rewrite existing legislation if such legislation conflicted with the Dayton 
199 ELIZABETH M. COUSENS & CHARLES K. CATER, TOWARD PEACE IN BOSNIA: IMPLEMENTING 
THEDA YTON ACCORDS 130 (200 1). 
200 Peace Implementation Council, PIC Sintra Declaration at para. 5 (May 30, 1997), avail-
able at http://www.ohr.int/print/?content_id=5180 (visited Jan. 15, 2004). 
201 /d. at para. 6. 
202 See, id. Full implementation of the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, id. at para. 28; 
cooperation with the ICTY, id. at para. 35; essential economic reform legislation, id. at para. 
44; refugee return & property laws, id. at para. 46, 49; discrimination against and harassment 
of ethnic minorities, id. at para. 57; freedom of movement and communication, id. at para. 61 . 
203 General Framework Agreement, supra note 1, annex 10, art. V (Agreement on Civilian 
Implementation). 
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Peace Agreement.204 The PIC also welcomed the High Representative's in-
tention to dismiss public officials who obstructed the Peace Agreement or 
the High Representative's efforts to fulfill his mandate.205 This new under-
standing of the ORR's mandate is referred to as the "Bonn Powers." Armed 
with these new powers, the High Representative was now authorized to cre-
ate and enact laws that had been blocked by Bosnian government officials 
and to take disciplinary action against those officials who obstructed the im-
plementation ofDayton.206 
International authorities similar to the High Representative have been 
utilized in territories throughout the world to address governance prob-
lems. 207 In situations like those in Bosnia, two aspects of governance prob-
lems can develop: local actors may be unable to govern, or international ac-
tors may believe that local actors will govern in ways that conflict with the 
policy objectives of the international actors. 208 In response to these govern-
ance problems, international actors can develop reactive or proactive solu-
tions for addressing these problems. 209 Reactive projects are those that are 
204 Peace Implementation Council, Bonn Conclusions at art. X1(2)(b) (Dec. 10, 1997), avail-
able at http://www.ohr.int/pic/default.asp?content_id=5182 ("The Council welcomes the 
High Representative's intention to use his fmal authority in theatre regarding interpretation of 
the Agreement on the Civilian Implementation of the Peace Settlement in order to facilitate 
the resolution of difficulties by making binding decisions, as he judges necessary, on the fol-
lowing issues: . . . interim measures to take effect when parties are unable to reach agree-
ment, which will remain in force until the Presidency or Council of Ministers has adopted a 
decision consistent with the Peace Agreement on the issue concerned.") [hereinafter Peace 
Implementation Council]. 
205 Yordan, supra note 2, at 157; Peace Implementation Council, supra note 204, at art. 
X1(2)(c) ("The Council welcomes the High Representative's intention to use his fmal author-
ity in theatre regarding interpretation of the Agreement on the Civilian Implementation of the 
Peace Settlement in order to facilitate the resolution of difficulties by making binding deci-
sions, as he judges necessary, on the following issues: . . . other measures to ensure imple-
mentation of the Peace Agreement throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina and its Entities, as 
well as the smooth running of the common institutions. Such measures may include actions 
against persons holding public office or officials who are absent from meetings without good 
cause or who are found by the High Representative to be in violation of legal commitments 
made under the Peace Agreement or the terms for its implementation."). 
206 CousENS & CATER, supra note 199, at 131 (emphasis in original). 
207 See Ralph Wilde, From Danzig to East Timor and Beyond: The Role of International Ter-
ritorial Administration, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 583, 592 (2001); see also Simon Chesterman, 
Building Democracy through Benevolent Autocracy: Consultation and Accountability in UN 
Transitional Administrations, in THE UN ROLE IN PROMOTING DEMOCRACY: BETWEEN IDEALS 
AND REALITY 86-88 (Edward Newman & Roland Rich eds., 2004). 
208 /d. 
209 !d. at 600. 
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grafted "onto an existing governance structure operated by local actors, and 
power is exercised in an ad hoc fashion."210 Officials operating in a reactive 
project exercise their authority only when local actors fail to implement nec-
essary policy or take other needed action.211 Alternatively, proactive projects 
are designed so that international representatives exercise total administra-
tive control from the beginning.212 In the proactive model, international offi-
cials do not act in tandem with local actors because the local officials are 
thought to be unable or unsuitable to perform the necessary administrative 
tasks.213 While proactive projects work to initiate "good governance" at the 
outset," reactive projects only respond to specific instances of "bad govem-
ance."214 
One of the challenges faced by the OHR was that it was created as a re-
active solution to Bosnia's governance problems. The Dayton Agreement 
fashioned the OHR as a tool for assisting the Bosnian government as it im-
plemented the civilian aspeCts of Dayton. Thus, after governance issues de-
veloped, the OHR continued in a reactive role. The Bosnian political elites 
were therefore able to maintain their political power and authority and the 
High Representative was authorized to act only when action or inaction by 
Bosnian officials undermined implementation of the Dayton Accords.215 
210 ld. 
211 /d. ("Thus, the exercise of powers by the League in Danzig, the United Nations in Cambo-
dia (other than conducting elections), and the supervisor in Brcko between 1997 and 2000--
whether negative (e.g., vetoes) or positive (e.g., appointments, passing legislation)-was 
aimed at stepping in to correct 'mistakes."'). 
212 /d. at 600-01. 
213 /d. at 600. 
214 /d. at 601. 
215 See supra note 207; General Framework Agreement, supra note I, at annex 10, art. II(I ) 
(Agreement on Civilian Implementation). The Dayton negotiators initially gave the OHR a 
strong mandate, which included direct authority over the international organizations working 
to implement the civilian aspects of Dayton. See · DAALDER, supra note 9, at 157; Mirko 
Klarin, Interview: Carlos Westendorp, the High Representative in BiH, NASA BORBA (Dec. 
12, 1997), at http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/presso/pressi/default.asp?content_id=3409 (Feb. 5, 
2004) [hereinafter Klarin]("In the beginning, the Europeans wanted a strong HR. Russians, 
too. But Americans were hesitating back then. The situation changed: now everybody wants 
the implementation process to be accelerated, that's why they support the authority which 
would enable the HR to achieve it."). As discussed above, this mandate was subsequently 
weakened once the drafters were made aware of the nationality of the first High Representa-
tive. See discussion supra Part I(D). It is not evident, however, that the initial "strong" man-
date granted the OHR explicit authority over local government officials. 
The idea of a proactive project in Bosnia appears to have been rejected by the interna-
tional community early on in the peace negotiating process. Lord Owen recalls in the fall of 
1992 a "UN trusteeship for Bosnia-Herzegovina was much in vogue in the newspapers," but 
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Mandates for proactive projects, on the other hand, explicitly grant the 
international administration plenary administrative authority. Such man-
dates create protectorate-like conditions as is demonstrated in the mandates 
for Mostar, Kosovo, East Timor, and Cambodia. The Memorandum of Un-
derstanding on the European Administration of Mostar ("EUAM"), for ex-
ample, states that the "Administration of the Mostar city municipality will be 
assumed by the European Union" and that the "Administrator will have the 
powers necessary to fulfil the aims and principles of the EU Administration . 
. . and to administer the Mostar city municipality properly and efficiently."216 
As another example, in Kosovo the UN Security Council authorized the Sec-
retary-General to establish "an international civil presence ... in order to 
provide an interim administration for Kosovo ... which will provide transi-
tional administration while establishing and overseeing the development of 
provisional democratic self-governing institutions."217 The interim admini-
stration in Kosovo would be responsible for "[p ]erforming basic civilian 
administrative functions where and as long as required."218 Similarly, an in-
terim administration under the auspices of the UN was created for East 
Timor. The mandate for this project states that "a United Nations Transi-
tional Administration in East Timor (UNT AET) ... will be endowed with 
overall responsibility for the administration of East Timor and will be em-
powered to exercise all legislative and executive authority including the ad-
ministration of justice."219 Finally, the agreement creating the UN Transi-
that it was not feasible because the UN lacked human and fmancial resources. See OWEN, 
supra note 37, at 61 (1995). In interviews after the Bonn Conference, the High Representa-
tive and his Senior Deputy adamantly maintained that Bosnia was not a protectorate. 
Westendorp stated that, "[m]aybe the Dayton [sic] was not brave enough to say: 'the High 
Representative is the protector, and will have the executive and legislative authorities for the 
period.' They did not choose that model." Klarin, supra note 215, at *3; see also Sead Nu-
manovic, The RS Must Respect the Decisions from Bonn, DNEVNI A v AZ (Dec. 15, 1997), 
available at http://www .ohr.int/ohr-dept/presso/pressi/default.asp?content_id=341 0 (Feb. 5, 
2004) (interview with Hanns H. Schumacher, Senior Deputy High Representative ("I would 
like to stress this especially. I do not like this word, nor does anyone from the PIC. There will 
definitely not be a protectorate! OHR or any other office will not be an imposed governor of 
BiH. Our job is to find a negotiated compromise on the ground. This is our main assignment 
and our intention. Only if we cannot reach a compromise will we reach for secondary meas-
ures, which will be valid until some of the authorities agree and make the final decision that 
will be in accordance with DPA. It has nothing to do with a protectorate.")) 
216 See Memorandum of Understanding on the European Administration of Mostar, at art. 1, 
7(1) (July 5, 1994). 
217 See S.C. Res. 1244, U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., at para. IO, U.N. Doc. SIRES/1244 (1999). 
218 1d. at para. II (b). 
219 See S.C. Res. 1272, U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., at para. l, U.N. Doc. SIRES/I272 (1999). 
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tional Authority in Cambodia (UNT AC) states that "all administrative agen-
cies, bodies and offices acting in the field of foreign affairs, national de-
fence, finance, public security and information will be placed under the di-
rect control of UNT AC, which will exercise it as necessary to ensure strict 
neutrality. "220 Additionally, other administrative agencies, bodies, and of-
fices identified by the head of UNT AC were "placed under direct supervi-
sion or control of UNT AC and will comply with any guidance provided by 
it. ,221 
Unlike the specific mandates in the above examples, the High Represen-
tative's mandate is vague.222 Article V states that the High Representative is 
the "final authority . . . regarding interpretation of this Agreement on the ci-
vilian implementation of the peace settlement."223 High Representative Car-
los Westendorp broadly construed this clause as granting him "the possibil-
ity to interpret [his] own authorities and powers."224 He determined that his 
authority to facilitate the "resolution of any difficulties arising in connection 
with civilian implementation·" included the power to act as a mediator who 
could make and implement decisions. 225 This authority could be exercised 
"when the parties [were] unable to reach agreement," and included the abil-
ity to suspend the enforcement of legislation that did not comply with the 
Dayton Peace Agreement, and to dismiss government officials who "persis-
tently block[ed] the implementation of the Peace Agreement."226 After re-
viewing the Dayton Agreement, Westendorp concluded that "Dayton cov-
ered more powers for [his] post than [he] used in practice. "227 Anxious to 
220 See Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Con-
flict, Oct. 23, 1991, at annex 1, § B(l) (UNTAC Mandate), at 
http://www.usip.org/library/pa/cambodia/agree_comppol_1023199l.html (last vis-
ited Apr. 9, 2006). 
221 !d. at annex 1, § B(2) (UNTAC Mandate). 
222 See General Framework Agreement, supra note 1, at annex 10, art. II (Agreement on Ci-
vilian Implementation). 
223 See General Framework Agreement, supra note l, at annex 10, art. V (Agreement on Ci-
vilian Implementation). 
224 See Carlos Westendorp Reveals His Opinion about Bosnian Politicians, SLOBODNA 
BOSNA, Nov. 30, 1997, available at http://www.ohr.int/ohr-
dept/presso/pressi/default.asp?content_id=3407 at * 1. 
225 !d. at* 1-*2 ("Well then, if you like, you may call it a friendly arbiter."). 
226 See Carlos Westendorp, Speech by the High Representative, Carlos Westendorp, to the 
Peace Implementation Council (Dec. 9, 1997), available at 
http://www .esiweb.org!pdf/esi_europeanraj_keyspeeches_id_3.pdf (last visited Apr. 9, 2006). 
227 !d. at *2 ("I have the right to pass decisions important for the functioning of the BiH state, 
I would like BiH authorities to pass these decisions, but if they do not want to, then it has to 
be me."). 
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accelerate the implementation process, the PIC welcomed Westendorp's 
generous interpretation ofthe High Representative's mandate.228 
V. CHALLENGES TO INCREASING MODERATE 
POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 
Fundamental problems in Bosnia's political and electoral systems en-
abled obstructionist nationalist leaders to obtain and sustain political power. 
Westendorp's revised understanding of the High Representative's mandate, 
while effective in mitigating and sometimes preventing the damage caused 
by Bosnia's political elites, did not address these problems. In recent years, 
the Office of the High Representative has focused on fortifying Bosnia's po-
litical institutions to withstand the pressure of internal debates and to con-
structively address controversial matters. The constant and invasive role of 
the international community and the High Representative has had the unin-
tended effect of undermining government officials' sense of ownership of 
their country.229 Rather than developing solutions to encourage the growth of 
domestic mechanisms to hold officials accountable for their decisions, the 
OHR's invasive approach has shielded officials from having to make un-
popular decisions. This creates a cycle of dependency that the international 
community and the High Representative have become anxious to break.230 
228 Peace Implementation Council, supra note 204, at art. XI(2). 
229 Gerald Knaus & Felix Martin, Travails of the European Raj, 14 J. DEMOCRACY 68 (2003) 
[hereinafter Knaus & Martin] (noting a desire by Bosnian officials to have the OHR make and 
enforce controversial policy decisions). 
230 /d. In November 2000, former High Representative Wolfgang Petritsch fostered a rela-
tionship based on partnership and mutual respect with the new Democratic Alliance for 
Change government. This was a new type of relationship for High Representative Petritsch, 
as his relationship with the previous Bosnian governments, comprised of nationalists could 
best be characterized as "highly interventionist." !d. He frequently used his Bonn Powers to 
implement legislation and remove officials deemed to be obstructionists. High Representative 
Ashdown has continued High Representative Petritsch's efforts at partnership with the Bos-
nian government despite the return of the nationalist parties in the October 2002 election be-
cause of the officials' expressed support of Ashdown's reform proposals. Int'l Crisis Group, 
Bosnia's Nationalist Governments: Paddy Ashdown and the Paradoxes of State Building 
(Balkan Rep. No. 146) (July 22, 2003), at 3. This type of partnership approach was not at-
tempted during the earlier days of the High Representative. While the nationalist party lead-
ers in the mid- to Jate-1990s expressed their support of the return goals, they continuously 
failed to take action to realize the goals. The international community gave the leaders sev-
eral deadlines for passing new property legislation, which were consistently ignored (perhaps 
other examples of inaction and non-cooperation). Therefore it is understandable why the 
High Representative would not see the Bosnian government officials of those days as reliable 
partners in implementing the Dayton return goals. In the face of consistent obstruction, the 
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The following analysis examines Bosnia's evolving electoral system and its 
political institutions. It then identifies the problems that led to the govern-
ance difficulties that Bosnia faced in the early post-war years. 
A. Electoral Obstacles 
The electoral system231 is one of the state's most powerful instru-
ments for shaping its political system232 because the electoral system "can be 
purposively designed to achieve particular outcomes, and [can] structure the 
arena of political competition" by rewarding "particular types of behavior 
and plac[ing] constraints on others."233 One of the goals in deeply segmented 
societies is to create a political structure in which political representatives 
can work with one another across divisions to develop practical and enforce-
able solutions to contentious issues. 
Lijphart has identified one key structural incentive that encourages 
compromise and accommodation within consociationalism: the prospect of 
participating in the government as a member of the governing coalition. 234 In 
a multiparty system, where no one party carries a majority (which is as-
sumed in consociationalism), parties must build coalitions to form a gov-
ernment. Consequently parties have an incentive to enter into and remain in 
coalition cabinets if they want to gain power. In order to build a coalition, 
parties must be willing to develop new policy positions (and strategies for 
their implementation) that reflect the various positions of the coalition part-
ners. This process generally requires making compromises after finding a 
middle ground between competing positions. Thus the coalition building 
process is argued to have a moderating effect because extreme positions 
cannot survive.235 
Coalition building in Bosnia, however, has not produced the moderating 
High Representative chose a course of action that kept the nationalist party officials out of the 
decision-making process. 
231 The electoral system as defined by Benjamin Reilly refers to the "formula by which votes 
are converted into seats, including ... the structure of electoral districts." Benjamin Reilly, 
Post-Conflict Elections: Constraints and Dangers, 9 INT'L PEACEKEEPING 118, 124 (2002) 
[hereinafter Reilly]. 
232 Arend Lijphart, The Alternative Vote: A Realistic Alternative for South Africa? 18 
POLITIKON 91 ( 1991) [hereinafter The Alternative Vote] (noting that the electoral system "has 
long been recognized as probably the most powerful instrument for shaping the political sys-
tem"). 
233 Reilly, supra note 231, at 126-27. (INT'L PEACEKEEPING); see also Arend Lijphart, Elec-
toral Systems, in S .M. Lipset (ed.), THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF DEMOCRACY 412 (1995). 
234 DEMOCRACY IN PLURAL SOCIETIES, supra note 6, at 31. 
235 See The Alternative Vote, supra note 232, at 93. 
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effect desired by the international community. With their sweeping suc-
cesses in most of Bosnia's post-war elections, the extreme nationalist parties 
have been able to form coalition governments while compromising few of 
their political goals. Two factors figured significantly in the early success of 
the extreme nationalist parties and created an atmosphere that enabled their 
continued electoral success until the 2000 general elections. The first was 
widespread interference in and manipulation of the registration of refugee 
and displaced person voters. The second was the harassment and intimida-
tion of opposition parties in an effort to limit electoral competition. 
1. Voter Registration 
Political elites throughout Bosnia manipulated the voter registration 
process to solidify the post-war ethnic demographics of their municipalities. 
The Agreement on Elections states that a 
citizen who no longer lives in the municipality in which he or she re-
sided in 1991 shall, as a general rule, be expected to vote, in person 
or by absentee ballot, in that municipality, provided that the person is 
determined to have been registered in that municipality as confirmed 
by the local election commission and the Provisional Election Com-
mission. 236 
Citizens could also, however, apply to the Provisional Election Com-
mission to cast their ballots in another municipalitj37 by filling out a P-2 
form and stating the municipality in which the voter intended to live.238 Day-
ton took for granted that the return of refugees would be well underway by 
the time of the first elections. Therefore it was assumed that refugees and 
displaced persons would be in the process of returning to their pre-war mu-
nicipalities, thus beginning the reintegration process.239 By fall 1996, how-
ever, returns had not taken place in any significant numbers. Within the 
Federation, displaced Bosniacs and Bosnian Croats generally registered to 
vote in their 1991 municipalities by absentee ballot, while others expressed 
an intention to travel to that municipality on election day to vote. A smaller 
236 General Framework Agreement, supra note 1, at annex 3, art. IV(l) (Agreement on Elec-
tions). 
237 /d. This was a compromise to accommodate the Bosniac desire to allow absentee voter 
registration to vote in the area where they lived in 1991 and the Serb position that people 
should register in person in Bosnia in the area they desired to vote in. HOLBROOK£, supra 
note 66, at 289, 309. 
238 Elections in Bosnia & Herzegovina, supra note 19, at 35. 
239 See, e.g., id. at 35. 
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number sought to vote in the municipality in which they currently lived.240 In 
the Republika Srpska an opposite pattern emerged. The majority of dis-
placed persons from the Federation living within the Republika Srpska 
sought to vote in the Republika Srpska. This choice appears to have been 
coerced by Bosnian Serb authorities who stated that displaced persons would 
receive housing, aid, and other benefits only upon presenting a certificate 
stating an intention to live in a municipality within the Republika Srpska.241 
A similar system existed for Bosnian Serb refugees in the FRY. A total of 
123,007 Bosnian Serb refugees in the FRY registered to vote in the Repub-
lika Srpska in the municipality in which they intended to live via the P-2 
form. Few were told that they had the option of voting in the Federation or 
that they could choose the specific Republika Srpska municipality in which 
they intended to live. 242 In fact, the polling station information was already 
filled in on many of the P-2 forms that the refugees received.243 It just so 
happened that the pre-selected municipalities were all former Bosniac-
majority areas?44 Bosnian Serb refugees in the FRY were bussed to theRe-
publika Srpska to vote in person on election day and were required to pro-
duce voting slips, which were distributed outside of the polling stations, for 
the return trip to the FRY to maintain their eligibility for benefits. 245 
Interest in ensuring Bosnian Serb majorities in Republika Srpska led 
government officials from the Republika Srpska, the FRY, and the Republic 
of Serbia to direct Bosnian Serb voters to vote in Republika Srpska munici-
palities that had Bosniac majorities before the war"246 This strategy concen-
trated Bosnian Serb voters in the Republic Srpska in an effort to minimize 
the influence of any remaining Bosniacs and Bosnian Croats.247 It also rein-
240 ld. at 35. 
241 ld. at 35-36. 
242 !d. at 37. 
243 !d. 
244 !d. at 51 ("Concentrations of refugees in Yugoslavia were clearly twined with towns in 
Republika Srpska to ensure that the operation ran smoothly.") 31,278 registered for Brcko, 
19,746 for Srebrenica, 12,365 for Zvomik, 11,362 for Doboj, 8,595 for Foca, 5,878 for Prije-
dor, and 3,159 for Modrica. /d. at 37 (citing Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (OSCE), Report on Refugee Voter Registration, annex B4 (Aug. 24, 1996)). 
245 !d. at 51. 
246 !d. at 37. 
247 Despite these efforts, a significant number of Bosniacs live in the Republika Srpska and 
have successfully elected SDA candidates to the Bosnian House of Representatives. In 1996 
and 1998, the SDA garnered 17.38% and 16.55% of the votes within the Republika Srpska 
respectively, which granted the SDA one of the fourteen Republika Srpska seats in the Bos-
nian House of Representatives. See OSCE, 1998 General Elections - Results (Oct. 2, 1998) 
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forced the post-war ethnic demographics of municipalities, thwarting the in-
ternational community's hope that the return of refugees and displaced per-
sons would reintegrate monoethnic municipalities. The UNHCR Special 
Envoy for the Former Yugoslavia, Soren Jessen-Petersen, warned that 
"[ r ]esults of the registration for the September elections herald a dismal fu-
ture for multi-ethnicity in Bosnia and Herzegovina .... [T]he tactics used in 
the campaign will produce hard-line winners and xenophobic nationalists 
committed to the maintenance of hostile homogeneous statelets."248 The 
1996 campaign tactics not only included manipulating voter registration, but 
also violence and intimidation to limit electoral competition. 
2. Restricted Opposition 
Opposition parties and candidates participating in the September 1996 
elections were often denied adequate access to the media and were subject to 
violent attacks and intimidation tactics?49 This occurred despite agreement 
by the Dayton parties to ensure the existence of a "politically neutral envi-
ronment." Haris Silajdzic, the former Prime Minister of Bosnia and the 
leader of one opposition party, the Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(SBiH),250 was physically attacked at a rally when it was interrupted by SDA 
supporters in Cazin, a northern town near Bihac?51 The International Crisis 
Group reported that another senior SBiH official was physically assaulted in 
Cazin, a northern town near Bihac.252 The OSCE documented that explosives 
were found in the room where the Socialist Party of Republika Srpska 
(SPRS) had a scheduled meeting in Brcko.253 The SPRS was the target of 
[hereinafter General Elections 1998], available at http://www.oscebih.org/documents/91-
eng.pdf; OSCE, General Elections 1996 Results (Sept. 4, 1996) [hereinafter General Elections 
1996], available at http://www.oscebih.org/docurnents/90-eng.pdf. In 2000, that percentage 
fell to 7.4%. OSCE, General Elections 2000- Vote Breakdown (Nov. 28, 2000) [hereinafter 
General Elections 2000], available at http://www.oscebih.org/documents/1 00-eng.pdf. 
248 Elections in Bosnia & Herzegovina, supra note 19, at 36 (quoting Soren lessen-Petersen's 
Aug. 26, 1996 statement). 
249 General Framework Agreement, supra note I, at annex 3, art. 1(1) (Agreement on Elec-
tions); Elections in Bosnia & Herzegovina, supra note 19, at 20. 
250 The abbreviation is taken from the Bosniac/Croatian/Serbian name of the party, Stranka za 
Bosnu i Hercegovinu. Elections in Bosnia & Herzegovina, supra note 19, at 20. 
251 Id. The Election Appeals Sub-Commission (EASC), mandated by the PEC Rules and 
Regulations to ensure compliance with the PEC Rules, found that the SDA was responsible 
for the attack on Silajdzic and punished the party by removing the first seven names on the 
SDA party list for the municipal elections in Cazin. !d. at 38. 
252 !d. at 20. 
253 Elections in Bosnia & Herzegovina, supra note 19, at 20 (citing OSCE, Democratisation 
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violence when a vehicle used by an SPRS member was blown up in down-
town Doboj.254 Explosives were also used against the Social Democratic 
Party (SDP) when the party's headquarters in Cazin were bombed?55 Indi-
viduals affiliated with the Union of Bosnian and Herzegovinian Social De-
mocrats (UBSD) were subject to similar attacks. Masked police officers 
beat up Representative Zoraid Mehici after a radio show in Tesanj in August 
1996.256 Additionally, a group of unidentified males yelled that they 
"wouldn't allow the UBSD to divide Bosniacs, because as a nation they 
didn't need more than one party" as they fired gunshots through the front 
door of Ismet Subasic's home, who was the UBSD representative in Ma-
jlaj.257 
Less violent means were also used to undermine political opposition in 
the months preceding the September election. For example, the deputy 
mayor of Ilidza and three of his staff were dismissed after they changed their 
political affiliation and joined the SBiH; however, the deputy major was 
later reinstated.258 In Bihac, the police seized 349 United List campaign 
posters and 5,000 leaflets because the items were "against the ruling 
party. ,2s9 
By limiting the field of electoral competition, the extreme nationalist 
parties significantly increased the likelihood of their electoral success. 
Without moderate political parties taking part in the coalition government-
forming process, there was little chance that the process would have a mod-
erating effect. Coalition building can have a moderating effect because par-
ties interested in staying in power have to reach compromises with their coa-
lition partners.260 This assumes, however, that the parties have different 
policy positions on which they can compromise. The positions of the ex-
treme nationalist parties regarding issues such as minority returns and the 
development of a functioning, unified central Bosnian state are more similar 
than different from one another, requiring little compromise. Thus, a high-
priority item on the international community's agenda for Bosnia has been to 
limit the power and effectiveness of the extreme nationalist parties. This has 
and Human Rights Periodic Report: 30 July- 12 August 1996 ( 1996)). 
254 Id. (citing OSCE, Democratisation and Human Rights Periodic Report: 30 July- 12 Au-
gust 1996 (1996)). 
255 !d. at 26. 
256 !d. at 25. 
257 !d. at 25-26. 
258 1d. at 26. 
259 United List (Zdruzena Lista) was a significant opposition coalition in the Federation. 1d. 
260 The Alternative Vote, supra note 232, at 93. 
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resulted in the PEC taking disciplinary action against political parties that 
used physical violence to intimidate non-nationalist political parties as per 
the High Representative's Bonn Powers.261 While these strategies effectively 
limit the detrimental effect of obstructionist elites, they do not address the 
structural aspects of Bosnia's electoral system or political structure that fail 
to moderate extremists and limit the election of moderate political elites. 
There are several strategies that could have been adopted by the OHR or 
the OSCE to increase the likelihood that Dayton's consociational democratic 
structure would succeed. For example, specific electoral engineering tools 
such as preferential voting could have been utilized. 262 As will be discussed 
below, preferential voting can be a viable tool for improving the likelihood 
that moderate political parties and candidates will be elected when certain 
social conditions exist. Absent these conditions, the emergence of moderate 
candidates, let alone moderate political parties, is unlikely. Therefore, this 
article proposes an alternative approach that would revise Bosnia's political 
institutional structure to create a broadly inclusive grand coalition. Such an 
institution could serve as a starting point for ensuring the participation of 
moderate voices in the development of government policy. 
B. Preferential Voting as an Alternative 
Preferential voting is an electoral system that rewards moderation by 
making politicians dependent on votes from individuals outside of their own 
groups?63 Benjamin Reilly describes this system, also referred to as an alter-
native vote system, as a: 
majoritarian electoral system in which voters rank-order candidates 
in order of their preference; if no candidate receives an absolute ma-
jority of ftrst preferences, the lowest candidate is eliminated and his 
or her second preferences [are] transferred to the remaining candi-
dates. This process continues until one candidate has an absolute 
majority of all votes and is declared elected.264 
Due to the requirement of an absolute majority, political parties and 
261 As noted above, the Bonn Powers enable the High Representative to neutralize the actions 
of the extreme nationalist parties when they have blocked efforts to implement the Dayton 
Peace Agreement. 
262 Part V(B) examines the potential usefulness of this tool, which was used in the 2000 Re-
publika Srpska presidential and vice-presidential election. 
263 See DONALD L. HOROWITZ, A DEMOCRATIC SOUTH AFRICA? CONSTITUTIONAL 
ENGINEERING IN A DIVIDED SOCIETY 196 (1991) [hereinafter HOROWITZ]. 
264 Benjamin Reilly, The Alternative Vote and Ethnic Accommodation: New Evidence from 
Papua New Guinea, 16 ELECTORAL STUDIES 1 ( 1997). 
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candidates will not only seek to secure votes from their traditional support 
base, but will also reach out to obtain second preference votes from the core 
supporters of other political parties. In an effort to obtain second preference 
votes, political parties will be more likely to compromise and adopt accom-
modating policy positions?65 
In the years leading up to the adoption of the Election Law by the Bos-
nian Parliament in 200 I, international and local actors discussed preferential 
voting as a strategy for moderating Bosnian politics. This system was not 
utilized, however, until the 2000 Presidential and Vice Presidential elections 
in Republika Srpska. 
In the years preceding the 200 I Election Law the OSCE experimented 
with a variety of electoral systems. 266 The OSCE was able to experiment be-
cause the Bosnian Constitution does not require any particular electoral sys-
tem for the Presidency or the House of Representatives. In 1996, the OSCE 
adopted a first-past-the-post or winner-take-all electoral system for the Bos-
nian Presidency and a simple quota proportional representation system with 
closed lists.267 Voting was conducted on an Entity-wide basis. By 2000 open 
lists were utilized along with preferential voting for the President and Vice 
President of the Republika Srpska, and members of the Bosnian House of 
Representatives were elected using multi-member constituencies within each 
Entity. 
Preferential voting was a controversial aspect of the 1999 draft election 
law. In 1999 the OSCE created a committee of six Bosnians and three for-
eign experts to draft the Election Law for Bosnia. The committee's draft law 
included provisions for using preferential voting to elect the members of the 
Bosnian Presidency and the President and the Vice-President of the Repub-
lika Srpska. 268 These provisions were so controversial that by May 2000 the 
265 !d. at 2. Horowitz asserts that this electoral system "will make moderation rewarding by 
making politicians reciprocally dependent on the votes of members of groups other than their 
own. The dependence is only marginal, of course, but it will sometimes be the margin of vic-
tory." HOROWITZ, supra note 263, at 196 (1991). 
266 The 2000 general election was the last election that the OSCE was responsible for running. 
267 In a first-past-the-post-system the candidate that wins the highest number of votes wins the 
election. In a proportional representation system each party presents the electorate with a list 
of candidates. In a closed list system the public votes for a list, not a candidate. The party 
lists the candidates according to its priorities and candidates at the top of the list are elected 
first. In an open list system, the voters indicate a preference for specific candidates on the list 
and the candidates with the most votes are elected first. See HOROWITZ, supra note 263, at 
166. 
268 See Draft Election Law of Bosnia and Herzegovina, arts. 8.3, 9.2 (Sept. 14, 1999), avail-
able at http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/1999/CDL(l999)044-e.asp. See also supra note 267. 
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Bosnian Parliament had not passed an election law. 269 The PIC had intended 
for the 2000 elections to be run by the Bosnian government in accordance 
with legislation passed by the Bosnian Parliament. Without an election law, 
the PIC extended the OSCE's mandate, thereby making the OSCE responsi-
ble for conducting and supervising the November 2000 elections. The PIC 
requested, however, that the OSCE incorporate aspects of the draft Election 
Law in the provisional rules and regulations for the elections; specifically 
open lists, multi-member constituencies, and preferential voting?70 Despite 
the controversial reaction to preferential voting, the system was used for the 
Republika Srpska presidential race in 2000?71 
In 1999, when preferential voting was first introduced, the extreme na-
tionalist parties had a seemingly firm grip on power in Bosnia. They had 
been successful in the two preceding elections, and understandably did not 
support a change to the electoral system that could destabilize their monop-
oly on elected offices. It is not clear, however, that preferential voting 
would have undermined the political power of the extreme nationalist parties 
269 See Janez Kovac & Edina Becirevic, Bosnia's Draft Election Law Exposes Dayton's 
Flaws, BOSNIA REPORT (Aug.-Nov. 1999), available at 
http://www.bosnia.org.uklbosrep/augnov99/draft_election.cfm. 
270 Peace Implementation Council, Declaration of the Peace Implementation Council (May 
24, 2000), available at http://www.ohr.int/pic/default.asp?content_id=5200. · When the Bos-
nian Parliament enacted the final Election Law in September 2001, there were no provisions 
for preferential voting. See Election Law of Bosnia and Herzegovina, ch. 8 (Sept. 28, 2001) 
(translation by OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina Electionllmplementation Depart-
ment based on local language version printed in the Bosnian Official Gazette No. 23/01 (Sept. 
19, 2001), HR Decision 139 (Mar. 28, 2002), HR Decision 148 (Apr. 18, 2002) & HR Deci-
sion 151 (Apr. 19, 2002)), available at http://www.oscebih.org/documents/25-eng.pdf. 
271 The SDS won the election for the President and Vice President of Republika Srpska after 
one transfer of votes. The SDS won 49.8% of the first preference votes and obtained 50.1% 
after the second preferences were transferred to the appropriate parties. The party obtaining 
the second highest number of first preference votes was the SNSD with 25.7%. The SDS, by 
obtaining close to an absolute majority of votes after the first preference votes were counted, 
did not need to obtain many second preference votes to win the election, while the SNSD had 
to gain a significant number of second preference votes to oust the SDS out-of its first place 
position. See General Elections 2000, supra note 247. These election results demonstrate a 
caveat to the preferential voting system noted by Horowitz, the logic of the system only works 
if there is no majority party in the multiparty system-"[i]f a party can win on first prefer-
ences, second preferences are irrelevant." HOROWITZ, supra note 263, at 194. While the SDS 
could not win outright on first preferences, it was close and the party in second place was too 
far away from winning a majority of the vote for second preferences to be helpful. Interest-
ingly, the SBiH received the largest number of second preference votes, but it only had 6% of 
the first preference votes, and the 5,220 second preference votes only gave it 6.8%. See Gen-
eral Elections 2000, supra note 247. 
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because one of the necessary preconditions for preferential voting to have a 
moderating effect did not exist. 
As discussed above, preferential voting is intended to deliver moderate 
political parties and candidates because of the need to gain an absolute ma-
jority of votes. When no particular political party can win an absolute ma-
jority by itself, voters' second and third preferences become important. Ad-
herents of preferential voting envision political parties negotiating with the 
political parties of rival groups to obtain those parties' members second 
preference votes.272 Donald Horowitz even stipulates that the existence of 
ethnically heterogeneous constituencies is a prerequisite for a system of 
preferential voting to be effective?73 The constituencies for the Bosnian 
Presidency elections were essentially monoethnic. Citizens residing in the 
Republika Srpska are only allowed to vote for the Bosnian Serb member of 
the Bosnian Presidency, while individuals in the Federation can vote for only 
one of two members, the Bosniac or Bosnian Croat member?74 Because eth-
nic cleansing was not completely effective, Bosniacs and Bosnian Croats 
live in the Republika Srpska and Bosnian Serbs live in the Federation. Con-
sequently they are able to vote for a Bosnian Presidency candidate who is 
not of their ethnic group. Yet because these groups are minorities within 
each Entity and the elections take place on an Entity-wide basis, they gener-
ally are unable to provide enough leverage through second or third prefer-
ence votes to elect moderate candidates, even if votes from the majority eth-
nic groups were split between competing political parties. Thus, it is 
unlikely that preferential voting for the Bosnian Presidency would be effec-
tive as a tool for moderating the positions of the extreme nationalist parties 
or increasing the likelihood of electoral success for moderate political par-
ties. 
In 1999, the extreme nationalist parties won each of the Bosnian Presi-
dency seats with an absolute majority. Thus they would not have assumed 
that the use of preferential voting in future elections would threaten their 
272 See, e.g., HOROWITZ, supra note 263, at 193. 
273 /d. at 195. 
274 But see Partial Decision III, Case No. U 05-98, at para. 65 (July 1, 2000) (Constitutional 
Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina), available at 
http://www.ccbh.ba/?lang=en&page=decisionslbyyear/2000. The Constitutional Court stated, 
It must not be forgotten that the Serb Member of the Presidency, for instance, is 
not only elected by voters of the Serb ethnic origin, but by all citizens of the Re-
publika Srpska with or without a specific ethnic affiliation. He thus represents 
neither the Republika Srpska as an Entity nor the Serb people only, but all the 
citizens of the Republika Srpska electoral unit. The same also holds for the Bos-
niac and Croat Members to be elected from the Federation. 
Moderating Politics in Post-Con{lict States 51 
electoral successes. 275 A year later, however, the tide had changed. In the 
2000 general elections, the extreme nationalist parties experienced their first 
major electoral upset. The moderate parties won a majority of the seats in 
the House of Representatives. In the 2002 general elections, the HDZ was 
the only party to win a Presidency seat with an absolute majority?76 Al-
though the SDA obtained only a slim majority of the votes with 3 7 .29%, it 
was sufficient to win the Bosniac seat. 277 The SBiH, however, came in a 
close second with 34.79% of the votes.278 The SDS prevailed in the race for 
the Bosnian Serb seat with a greater percentage of the vote, 35.52%, com-
pared to the SNSD, who took second place with 19.93%.279 
While it is unclear whether second or third preferences would have al-
tered the SDS' victory in the 2002 elections, it is entirely possible that pref-
erential voting could have enabled an SBiH victory. With the SDA and the 
SBiH only 12,935 votes apart, subsequent preferences could have enabled 
either party to win. 280 A win for the SBiH would have allowed a moderate 
political party to influence the selection of the Chair of the Council of Minis-
ters. Although the extreme nationalist parties captured 50% of the seats in 
the House of Representative, the SBiH won six seats. Although small, this 
block of seats could have been used to deliver majority victories to the ex-
275 For example, in 1996 the SDA won 80% of the votes for the Bosniac Presidential seat, the 
HDZ won 88.7% of the votes for the Bosnian Croat seat, and the SDS won 67.3% ofthe votes 
for the Bosnian Serb seat. See General Elections 1996, supra note 24 7. While the nationalist 
parties maintained their seats in the Presidency in 1998, their percentage of votes generally 
decreased. The SDA captured 86.8% of the vote as part of a coalition including Haris Sila-
jdzic's SBiH. The HDZ's support dropped to 53.91%, and the SDS won 51.31% of the vote 
as part of a coalition with the Serb Radical Party of Republika Srpska (SRS RS). See General 
Elections 1998, supra note 24 7. 
276 The HDZ captured 61.52% of the vote as part of a coalition with Democrscani. See Bos-
nia and Herzegovina Election Comm'n, Election 2002 Results (Oct. 19, 2002). 
277 !d. 
278 !d. 
279 !d. 
280 The SBiH is considered a moderate party, but it is also viewed as a pro-Bosniac party. 
During the 2000 election campaign, the SBiH advocated a stronger central state and the 
elimination of the two Entities. See Hadziosmanovic, supra note 198. The SBiH leader, 
Haris Silajdzic, was the Bosnian Foreign Minister during the war and defected from the SDA. 
The International Crisis Group has reported that the SBiH electoral success during the 2000 
municipal elections was due in large part to the "defection of substantial portions of the Bos-
niak electorate from SDA to SBiH, which they viewed as a viable Bosniak nationalist alterna-
tive." Int'l Crisis Group, Bosnia's Municipal Elections 2000: Winners and Losers, 11 (Apr. 
27, 2000) (ICG Balkans Rep. No. 91), available at http://www.crisisweb.org; see also Bos-
nian nationalists fear election tinkering, DEUTSCHE PRESSE-AGENTUR (Oct. 16, 2002) (noting 
that the SBiH is a pro-Bosniac political party). 
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treme nationalist parties on their legislative agenda. Thus, the SBiH might 
have been in a position to successfully negotiate compromises regarding cer-
tain Dayton goals with these seats and the Presidency. 
The use of preferential voting in 2002 may have been successful in 
electing officials who had moderate positions on sensitive intra-ethnic is-
sues. In 2000, many voters felt betrayed by the corruption of the extreme 
nationalist parties and the lack of economic progress made under their lead-
ership. Moderate parties had an opportunity to tum this disappointment into 
votes. If a preferential voting system had been in place, then the moderates 
may have been able to win with second preference votes. Yet there is no in-
dication that political parties that are moderate with regard to intra-ethnic is-
sues would similarly be moderate on inter-ethnic issues. 
The monoethnic electorates for Bosnia's Presidency prevented preferen-
tial voting from being a successful moderating tool. Political parties com-
peting for the Presidential seats did not have to reach across ethnic lines to 
be successful, and thus they did not have to moderate controversial ethnic-
related policy positions to increase the likelihood of their electoral success. 
This type of structural problem contributed to Bosnia's governance prob-
lems. Another structural problem with a similar result was the failure to in-
clude a grand coalition with the Bosnian government that includes represen-
tatives from all of the significant groups in Bosnia. 
C. Political and Social Obstacles to Moderate Participation 
Grand coalitions are a necessary component in successful consociational 
democracies. To the extent that grand coalition institutions existed in Bos-
nia, however, they focused solely on ethnic representation. The Dayton ne-
gotiators identified ethnicity as the most significant cleavage within Bosnian 
society. Consequently they sought to ensure equal Bosniac, Bosnian Croat, 
and Bosnian Serb participation within the government. By dividing Bosnia 
into two Entities with distinct ethnic identities281 and by having a two-
281 The ethnic identity of the Bosnian territory was established in the Washington Agreement, 
which preceded the Dayton peace talks, and established the Federation of Bosnia and Herze-
govina. Washington Agreement, Mar. I, 1994, Bosnia-Croatia-Bosnian Croats, available at 
http://www.usip.org/library/pa!bosnia/washagree_03011994_toc.html. Once the parties 
reached Dayton, the Federation as a political entity was a given; however its physical bounda-
ries were a matter of intense negotiations. In the Washington Agreement, the parties stated 
that "[t]he undersigned have agreed on the attached Framework Agreement establishing a 
Federation in the areas of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina with a majority Bosniac 
and Croat population ... " Id.at preamble. The Framework Agreement similarly states that 
"Bosniacs and Croats, as constituent peoples (along with others) and citizens of the Republic 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the exercise of their sovereign rights, transform the internal 
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pronged basis for political representation-ethnicity and geographic location-
the Dayton negotiators ensured that representation within the central Bosnian 
state would be divided into equal thirds between the Bosniacs, Bosnian 
Croats and Bosnian Serbs. 
After the first national elections in 1996, it became clear that another 
major societal cleavage existed in Bosnia, the cleavage between those who 
supported the full implementation of Dayton and those who favored territo-
rial ethnic separation.282 The division on this issue is highlighted in the 
state's struggle to implement the Dayton obligations regarding the return of 
refugees and displaced persons. While this may appear to be a division be-
tween the Bosnian political leaders and the international community, it is 
equally a domestic division that has found, and continues to find, political 
expression. Dayton-friendly political parties and moderate politicians have 
existed since the first elections in 1996, and have received electoral support. 
For a variety of reasons, however, they have been marginalized by the over-
whelming influence and power of the extreme nationalist parties. These par-
ties' power and influence has been possible because of the economic prob-
lems, fear, and insecurity permeating Bosnian society.283 
The moderating effect of coalition building has been undermined in 
Bosnia by two separate but reinforcing factors that fail to ensure that repre-
sentatives from all significant segments of society are represented within the 
government. First, the electoral system for the Presidency addresses only 
one social cleavage: ethnicity. The Presidency is reserved for a Bosniac, a 
Bosnian Croat from the Federation, and a Bosnian Serb from the Republika 
Srpska. Second, certain social conditions have inhibited the development of 
and support for moderate political parties. As discussed above, the extreme 
nationalist parties have manipulated voter registration, intimidated moderate 
political parties and candidates to limit electoral competition, and have capi-
talized on a climate of fear and insecurity to increase the likelihood of their 
electoral success. 
1. The Presidency 
The Dayton negotiators mixed the parliamentary and presidential sys-
tems of government in a manner that undermines each system's structural 
structure of the territories with a majority of Bosniac and Croat population in the Republic of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina into a Federation, which is composed of federal units with equal 
rights and responsibilities." !d. at art. 1. 
282 This is despite the parties' accession to the Dayton Peace Agreement. See supra Parts 0 
and V(A). 
283 See e.g., supra Part V(A). 
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incentives for moderation .. In most parliamentary systems the executive 
branch of government is a cabinet that is selected by the legislature. Selec-
tion of the cabinet members, particularly the prime minister, is borne out of 
negotiations conducted by the parties that make up the governing coalition. 
In this system, the legislature has the power to dismiss the cabinet. 284 The 
parliamentary system is generally contrasted with the presidential form of 
government in which the executive power is held by one individual who is 
elected directly or indirectly by the citizens. In Bosnia the Presidency is 
elected directly by the people and the Presidency nominates the Chair of the 
cabinet (the Council of Ministers), but the legislature has no power to dis-
miss members of the Presidency. 285 The House of Representatives is respon-
sible for approving the Chair of the cabinet and the Chair's nominations for 
the other cabinet positions. The Council of Ministers is required to resign, 
however, if the House of Representatives cast a vote of no-confidence. 286 
By having a separate majoritarian election for the Presidency, a signifi-
cant aspect of the traditional coalition-forming process was altered. In order 
for political parties to be a part of the governing coalition they not only have 
to win a significant number of seats in the House of Representatives, they 
need to either win a seat in the Presidency or partner with a party that wins 
such a seat. Electoral success at both of these levels is complicated by the 
use of a majoritarian system within a monoethnic electorate for the Presi-
dency and proportional representation within a multiethnic electorate for the 
House of Representatives. These systems provide different incentives for 
moderation. Thus campaign methods used to solidify success at one level 
could undermine the party's success on the other level. 
After the Bosnian general elections in 1996, 1998, and 2002, the nation-
alist parties pooled the seats they won in the elections for the House of Rep-
resentatives to form exclusively nationalist coalition governments.287 While 
284 See, e.g., The Power-Sharing Approach, supra note 129, at 507. 
285 /d. 
286 General Framework Agreement, supra note 1, at annex 4 art. V(4)(c) (Constitution of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina). 
287 It would be incorrect to refer to these governments as coalitions of convenience because 
the nationalist parties shared a common ideology based on ethnic segregation. These parties 
were committed to the de facto separation of Bosnia into ethnic territories with strong re-
gional and local governments. None of the parties were interested in a strong central govern-
ment, fearing that such an arrangement would weaken the ability of the ethnic enclaves to 
self-govern. Consequently, I think that it is more accurate to refer to these nationalist gov-
ernments as coalitions of commitment. See DONALD L. HOROWITZ, ETHNIC GROUPS IN 
CONFLICT 367 (1985) (outlining the different types of coalitions that can be formed in a par-
liamentary system); see a/so infra text accompanying notes 301-305. 
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a coalition government made up of the SDA, HDZ BiH, and SDS can be said 
to constitute a grand coalition with regard to ethnicity, such governments ex-
clude representatives of those who support active implementation of the 
Dayton Accords. 288 As a result of these "not so grand" coalitions, efforts to 
implement aspects of Dayton, like the Refugee Agreement, have been pur-
posely obstructed. Since none of the members of the governing coalition 
were interested in implementing the Refugee Agreement there were no op-
portunities for moderation or compromise during the formation process of 
the governing coalition. The parties that would have pushed for such ac-
commodations were not successful enough at the polls to warrant participa-
tion in the governing coalition. 
Without the participation of such moderate political elites in Bosnian 
government, the High Representative must intervene in Bosnian politics, this 
can be viewed as a governing coalition partner with a trump card. As dis-
cussed in Part IV, the international community has implemented a reactive 
project to address governance problems in Bosnia. The High Representative 
has the authority, pursuant to the Bonn Powers, to implement legislation 
when the Bosnian government fails to do so, to rewrite existing legislation 
that conflicts with the Dayton Peace Agreement, and to dismiss public offi-
cials who obstruct the Agreements or the High Representative's efforts to 
fulfill his mandate?89 The Bonn Powers allow the High Representative to 
neutralize the governing coalition's inaction or obstruction, but they do not 
require the High Representative to work with the governing coalition to de-
velop compromises on controversial policy matters. 290 Rather, the High Rep-
resentative reacts to the actions or inactions of these governments. While the 
High Representative is involved in governing Bosnia, he has not been in-
volved in the government-formation process, which is one of the few proc-
esses in which compromises between the various parties could be made. 
2. Social Conditions 
A second significant issue relevant for the development of moderate po-
litical elites in Bosnia relates to certain historical facts and social conditions 
that have made the Bosnian electorate more likely to support extreme na-
288 These coalition governments also exclude representatives from other ethnic groups in Bos-
nia, like the Roma. 
289 See supra notes 225-28 and accompanying text. 
290 One likely reason for this approach is that representatives of the nationalist parties were 
present at Dayton and are actually parties to the Dayton Peace Agreements; therefore they are 
bound by its terms. There is no room to negotiate the substance of the Agreements, only oc-
casionally the manner in which specific obligations will be implemented. 
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tionalist parties that advocate ethnic separation. In 1996, voter registration 
was manipulated to ensure that Bosnian Serb voters were concentrated in the 
Republika Srpska to minimize the strength of Bosniac and Bosnian Croat 
votes within the Republic. 291 Moderate political parties and candidates were 
physically attacked and intimidated during the campaign for the 1996 elec-
tion, which undoubtedly hindered their support and development. As re-
cently as the 2000 general election, the nationalist parties capitalized on a 
climate of fear and insecurity. For example, the HDZ BiH erected billboards 
that read "(s]elf-determination or extermination" and developed a video clip 
depicting what appeared to be Muslim Ottoman horsemen using sabers to 
kill civilians while children cried in the background.292 The SDA had posters 
directed at Bosniac voters stating, "They all elected leaders of their kind, 
what about you?"293 The SDA also compared the multiethnic Social Democ-
ratic Party with the communist party that prohibited religious expression 
during its forty-five year rule of Yugoslavia.294 These campaign techniques 
demonstrate that the extreme nationalist parties perceive that there are elec-
toral gains to be made by exploiting ethnic-based fears. Such perceptions 
are not unreasonable in a post-war society like Bosnia where atrocities were 
committed against one ethnic group for the alleged benefit of another ethnic 
group.295 
Group-based violence has an intense and long-lasting impact on the so-
ciety in which it takes place. Members of the victim group often feel dimin-
ished and vulnerable, seeing the world as a dangerous place. 296 They also 
tend to see "outside" group members as hostile. 297 Staub and Pearlman con-
tend that when victim and perpetuator groups continue to live near each 
other, "reconciliation is essential both to stop a potentially continuing cycle 
of violence and to facilitate healing."298 Reconciliation refers to victims and 
291 See supra Part V(A)(I). 
292 Hadziosmanovic, supra note 198. This video clip was banned by an independent media 
commission. ld. 
293 Id. 
294/d. 
295 All three ethnic groups have experiences as members of both the victim and perpetuator 
groups during the 1992-1995 war. See supra Part I(C ). Therefore, when a reference is made 
to victim or perpetuator groups, it does not mean any particular ethnic group. 
296 Ervin Staub & Laurie Anne Pearlman, Healing, Reconciliation and Forgiving after Geno-
cide and Other Collective Violence, in FORGIVENESS AND RECONCILIATION: RELIGION, PUBLIC 
POLICY, & CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION (Raymond G. Helmick & Rodney L. Peterson eds.), at 
*195-*217 (2001). 
297 I d. at * I. 
298 ld. at *2. 
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perpetuators "coming to accept one another and developing mutual trust," 
accepting the past, not seeing it as defining the future, and seeing the human-
ity of each other.299 With reconciliation, the victim group's sense of security 
increases, while without it, feelings of insecurity and fear of violence are 
ever present.300 Thus reconciliation is essential for maintaining peace in 
Bosnia. 
Critics of the consociational approach contend that the problems out-
lined above, specifically the failure of the coalition formation process to lead 
to the development of moderate governments, are inherent in consociational-
ism. Donald Horowitz and others who advocate what has been termed an 
"integrative approach"301 to power sharing have noted that a significant 
problem with the consociational approach is that it assumes political elites 
want to cooperate and accommodate.302 These critics doubt this assumption 
and find it problematic that consociationalism does not provide structural in-
centives for such cooperation and accommodation.303 Furthermore, these 
critics argue that consociationalism assumes that proportional representation 
will enable the formation of broad-based coalitions. Horowitz contends that 
proportional representation cannot guarantee the development of such coali-
tions because this system can also lead to the formation of an opposition just 
like other electoral systems. Without guidelines to govern the creation of a 
governing coalition, the political parties with the most seats can form a "coa-
lition of convenience." Such a coalition is formed after an election for the 
sole purpose of forming a government even though the participating parties 
frequently have independent and often incompatible policy positions.304 
Moreover, these types of coalitions may not represent all of the significant 
299 /d. Desmond Tutu, former Episcopal Archbishop of Cape Town and chairman of the 
South Africa Truth and Reconciliation Commission has similarly defined reconciliation as 
creating trust and understanding among former enemies. Desmond Tutu, Foreword, in 
R.ECONCILIA TION AFTER CONFLICT: A HANDBOOK 6 (David Bloomfield, Teresa Bame, & Luc 
Huyse eds., 2003). 
300 !d. at 2. 
301 TIMOTHY SISK, POWER SHARING AND INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION IN ETHNIC CONFLICTS 33-
34 (1996). 
302 See, e.g., HOROWITZ, supra note 263, at 139-1; Reilly, supra note 231, at 127-28. 
303 HOROWITZ, supra note 263, at 142. A similar critique put forward by George Tsebelis and 
Steven Burg is that "consociational institutions may provide incentives for politicians" to in-
stigate "elite-imitated conflict." Such conflict is pursued because it increases the bargaining 
position of the elites "vis-a-vis other groups at the political center." SISK, supra note 30 I, at 
38-39. 
304 HOROWITZ, supra note 263, at 367. In a "coalition of convenience," the parties to the coa-
lition are elected on separate slates and they pool their seats to form the government. /d. 
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groups within the society, which prevents the development of a grand coali-
tion. 305 Lijphart responds that the coalition formation process is a structural 
incentive for moderation because political parties will not have the opportu-
nity to be part of the government unless they moderate extreme positions and 
generate accommodating policies. 306 
Despite disagreements as to which political and electoral systems pro-
vide the best conditions for moderate political elites to be successful, the 
power-sharing theories agree that moderate political elites307 are necessary 
for the formation and maintenance of stable democracies in plural socie-
ties.308 Horowitz maintains that electoral systems must reward political par-
ties for taking moderate positions on controversial matters. One means of 
doing this is adopting an electoral system that utilizes preferential voting. 
As the discussion in Part V(B) concludes, however, preferential voting 
would not be the best solution to Bosnia's governance problems because of 
the monoethnic electorate for the Presidency. Therefore the following sec-
tion addresses an institutional approach for dealing with the governance 
problems in Bosnia. 
D. A Grand Coalition Through Advisory Committees 
One of the key problems with the Bosnian political structure is that it 
did not include an institution that could serve as a grand coalition. While a 
grand coalition cabinet is the "prototypal consociational device," other insti-
tutions can serve this function.309 For example, in the Netherlands, perma-
nent or ad hoc committees and councils have been utilized. These commit-
tees or councils usually serve as advisory boards, but often exercise decisive 
influence. The Social and Economic Council is just one example of a per-
manent council that provides both solicited and unsolicited advice to the ad-
ministration and Parliament. This council has been made up of representa-
tives from each of the major segments of Dutch society that are stakeholders 
in the state's social and economic policy. Today those segments are labor, 
305 Id. 
306 See The Alternative Vote, supra note 232, at 93. 
307 Moderate political elites are defined here as elites who are willing to work with the elites 
of other groups to develop compromises to accommodate the divergent interests amongst the 
groups. This willingness stems from ' 'understand[ing] the perils of political fragmentation," 
and being committed to maintaining the existing political structure and improving societal 
cohesion and stability. Consociationa/ Democracy, supra note 4 at 79. 
308 See, e.g ., HOROWITZ, supra note 263, at 378-79; DEMOCRACY IN PLURAL SOCIETIES, supra 
note 6, at 53. 
309 See DEMOCRACY IN PLURAL SOCIETIES, supra note 6, at 31. 
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trade, and industry, but in the past religious and political segments were rep-
resented. 310 
The use of such a committee is one tool that the High Representative 
could have used to address the Bosnian government's inaction. It is possible 
that the Bosnian political elites would have been more receptive to advice 
from the advisory committee than from the High Representative because it is 
an advisory body with representatives from the major societal segments. In 
order to be a true grand coalition, unlike the Presidency or the Council of 
Ministers, the advisory committee would have to include a representative 
from each of the three major ethnic groups in Bosnia, other ethnic groups, 
and supporters of the active implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement. 
Over time, significant segments within Bosnian society will likely change 
and therefore the representatives on the advisory committee should likewise 
change. As ethnicity hopefully becomes a less salient aspect of Bosnians' 
identity within the political realm, ethnic representation will become less 
important. Additionally, currently weak cleavages may become stronger or 
new cleavages may develop. For all of these reasons a process must exist for 
determining which societal segments will be represented on the advisory 
committee. This process should be flexible enough to deal with the shifts 
noted above. 
Once the relevant societal segments have been selected, the High Repre-
sentative must have a transparent process for selecting the best individuals to 
serve on the advisory committee. The desired qualifications and characteris-
tics for candidates and the criteria used by the High Representative for se-
lecting committee members must be clear. Political parties, non-
governmental organizations, and other civil society organizations that repre-
sent the interests of the various groups identified for representation would 
nominate individuals for the advisory committee. As a committee estab-
lished by the High Representative to assist in the effective implementation of 
Dayton, the High Representative would select the members from the nomi-
310 See AREND LIJPHART, THE POLITICS OF ACCOMMODATION: PLURALISM AND DEMOCRACY IN 
THE NETHERLANDS 113-15 ( 1968). In 1968, Lijphart described the Social and Economic 
Council as having forty-five members, fifteen representing the labor unions, fifteen represent-
ing the employers, and fifteen appointed by the cabinet. 
The labor-union representatives are chosen by the large Socialist, Catholic, and Protestant un-
ions in proportion to their total memberships (7:5:3). The employers' representatives are 
mainly chosen by the large employers, farmers, and retailers associations of the Liberal, 
Catholic, and Calvinist blocs. The members chosen by the cabinet are individual experts, 
primarily professors of law or economics, but these positions are also carefully apportioned 
among the blocs. The law stipulates that all members vote independently and cannot be 
bound by the organizations they represent. /d. at 113. 
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nations submitted. In order for the committee to be as effective as possible, 
it is critical that the High Representative select representatives that accu-
rately represent the interests and positions of the various segments.311 The 
purpose of the grand coalition is to provide a forum in which the various so-
cietal segments can work together to develop acceptable accommodations on 
difficult and sensitive issues. If the parties negotiating the solutions do not 
represent the positions and interests of their constituents, then neither the 
electorate nor the elected officials will deem the resulting compromises le-
gitimate. Without legitimacy, the accommodations agreed upon by the 
grand coalition will be less effective in mitigating the controversial matters 
at issue. Therefore the High Representative should not merely appoint indi-
viduals who are most likely to support the High Representative's view as to 
how the Dayton Accords should be implemented, but rather he should ap-
point true representatives of the various segments who understand the perils 
of political fragmentation, are committed to a unified multiethnic Bosnian 
state, and are willing work to accommodate the divergent interests and de-
mands of the various segments of Bosnian society.312 
The effectiveness of the advisory committee will also depend on the 
committee's mandate and rules of procedure. The committee's mandate 
would be to assist the Bosnian government and the High Representative in 
developing Bosnia into a unitary, multiethnic, and functioning state, and im-
plementing the Dayton Peace Accords. To fulfill this mandate the advisory 
committee could provide the government and the High Representative with 
solicited or unsolicited advice. In light of the circumstances giving rise to 
the need for such a committee it is unlikely that the Council of Ministers 
would solicit the committee's advice, but the structure should allow for such 
requests. 
Ideally the committee's advice would represent negotiated solutions that 
would take the form of draft legislation. Such legislation would be pre-
sented to the body that solicited the advice, or to both the Council of Minis-
ters and the High Representative if the advice is unsolicited. When the 
committee's advice is solicited from the High Representative, he would re-
view the proposed legislation and then present it to the Council of Ministers 
for action.313 The Council of Ministers would have sixty days to act upon it. 
311 Lijphart contends that this is best done by group members, but Horowitz states that it is 
sufficient to have representatives that incorporate the concerns and interests of the group at 
issue. See The Alternative Vote, supra note 232, at 96; HOROWITZ, supra note 263, at 165. 
312 See Consociational Democracy, supra note 4, at 207. 
313 Action in this context refers to submitting the proposed legislation to Parliament for a vote, 
or ratifying it in an acceptable way and submitting the revised legislation to Parliament for a 
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If the Council of Ministers fails to act within that timeframe, the High Rep-
resentative could then either: ( 1) submit the proposed legislation to Parlia-
ment for a vote, and if such action was not taken within sixty days, enact the 
legislation himself, or (2) unilaterally implement the legislation without first 
submitting it to Parliament.314 
Using an advisory committee to brainstorm, debate, and negotiate the 
most acceptable solutions to the problems identified by the High Representa-
tive in a public and transparent process is a strategy for reducing government 
deadlock. The High Representative has consistently identified areas in 
which legislative action is necessary to overcome government inaction. As a 
result of the Bonn Powers, the early post-Bonn High Representatives unilat-
erally imposed any necessary legislation. This process was, however, 
shrouded in mystery. It was unclear how much and what kind of local con-
sultation took place to ascertain the likelihood of success for the proposed 
solutions. The use of advisory councils as proposed here increases transpar-
ency and provides the Council of Ministers with proposed solutions that are 
deemed acceptable by the various societal segments. The Council of Minis-
ters is thus more likely to forward such solutions to Parliament because they 
are politically feasible. It is possible that such a committee may do no more 
than provide opportunities for Bosnian officials to practice decision-making 
by consensus and develop effective techniques for resolving difficult politi-
cal issues. Such opportunities, however, would greatly contribute to the de-
vote. 
314 The process is similar when the Council of Ministers solicits the advisory committee's ad-
vice. The committee would send its proposed legislation or solution in another format to the 
Council of Ministers. If the Council of Ministers fails to take action on the items within sixty 
days, the advisory committee would inform the High Representative of the Council of Minis-
ter's request for advice, the advice offered by the advisory committee, and the fact that the 
Council of Ministers failed to take the necessary action within sixty days. At that point the 
High Representative would have the choice of (1) taking no action, (2) submitting the pro-
posed legislation to Parliament for a vote, and if such action was not taken within sixty days, 
to enact the legislation himself, or (3) unilaterally implementing the legislation without first 
submitting it to Parliament. In the case of unsolicited advice, the advisory committee would 
submit its recommendations to the Council of Ministers and the High Representative at the 
same time. If the Council of Ministers fails to take action within sixty days, then as in the 
case of advice solicited by the Council of Ministers, the advisory committee would inform the 
High Representative that the Council of Ministers had failed to take any action regarding its 
advice. The High Representative would then have the option of ( 1) taking no action, (2) sub-
mitting the proposed legislation to Parliament for a vote and if such action was not taken 
within sixty days enact the legislation himself, or (3) unilaterally implementing the legislation 
without first submitting it to Parliament. 
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velopment of democratic institutions and processes in Bosnia.315 
While one of the problems with the executive branch of Bosnian gov-
ernment has been that it is not a true grand coalition, another problem is that 
the officials simply refused to enact necessary legislation. Extreme national-
ist Bosnian officials have indefinitely delayed measures needed for the de-
velopment of the Bosnian state that conflicted with maintaining separate 
ethnic enclaves within the Bosnian territory. An obvious question is how the 
proposed advisory committee would avoid a similar fate. The lack of a 
grand coalition and government inaction are linked. One of the reasons the 
government was able to obstruct, via inaction, the implementation of Dayton 
was that no member of the Presidency or the Council of Ministers was 
committed or interested in such goals. Consequently no one in a lawmaking 
position ever aggressively pushed needed legislation, and, as a result, Bos-
nian institutions never had to address the issues. This is how the advisory 
committee differs. First, it would have to respond to requests for advice 
from the High Representative, and second, the committee would have mem-
bers interested in providing solutions to the problems identified by the High 
Representative. Thus it would be critical to have mechanisms or external in-
centives to discourage and limit deadlock, rather than measures to prevent 
deliberate inaction. Procedures similar to those used by the PEC that grant 
the chairperson of the committee final decision-making authority could en-
sure that the committee's work is not impeded by frivolous disagreements 
between segment representatives. 
In recent years, the High Representative has organized ad hoc commis-
sions to develop legislative solutions for specific problems facing Bosnia. 
The commission members are local experts and government officials.316 
315 Even if the High Representative ended up enacting the recommendations of the advisory 
committee pursuant to the Bonn Powers, such an outcome is favorable to the unilateral im-
plementation of laws and regulations. Imposing legislation that is the end product of a local 
debate and consensus process aids in the development of democratic institutions in a way that 
the High Representative's unilateral action simply does not. 
316 See, e.g., OHR, Decision Establishing the Indirect Tax Policy Commission (Feb. 12, 2003), 
available at http://www.ohr.int/decisions/econdec/default.asp?content_id=29240. The High 
Representative created a commission to draft legislation that would merge separate customs ad-
ministrations into one, establish a single statewide value added tax, and create an Indirect Tax 
Administration. Jd. The Commission has seven members. The Prime Minister of each Entity 
and the Chairman of the Bosnian Council of Ministers each nominate two members, one of 
whom should be the minister responsible for finance matters. The High Representative and En-
tity officials appoint the seventh member, who also serves as the commission's chairperson. !d. 
The High Representative also created commissions to address defense reform and intelligence 
reform. OHR, Decision Establishing the Defense Reform Commission (May 9, 2003), available 
at http://www.ohr.int/ohr-deptlpresso/pressr/default.asp?content_id=29833; Office of the High 
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While the High Representative has consulted with local experts in the past, 
the particulars of the selection process were generally unknown, as were the 
details regarding the local experts' role in the decision-making process.317 
The members of the new commissions, who are generally appointed by gov-
ernment officials representing Bosnia and each Entity, would report to the 
High Representative. Yet like the power-sharing institutions created at Day-
ton, these commissions include only representatives from a limited number 
of societal segments. The ad hoc commissions will mirror the government 
institutions in terms of which societal segments are represented because 
government officials nominate the commission members. Generally this 
will translate into a three-way division of commission seats along ethnic 
lines. Without broadening the scope of societal segments represented on 
such commissions, they will fail to serve as grand coalition institutions. 
Without such institutions, Bosnia's power-sharing arrangements will con-
tinue to privilege the separatist agendas of the extreme nationalist parties at 
the expense of many other parts of Bosnian society.318 
CONCLUSION 
Bosnia is in need of a political strategy that would inject a moderate 
voice into the Bosnian government to counter the strength of the extreme na-
tionalist parties. The Dayton structure ensures that members of the signifi-
cant ethnic groups within Bosnian society are granted political representa-
tion. Unfortunately, no other societal segments are similarly ensured 
representation. As Bosnians and the international community have worked 
to implement the Dayton Peace Agreement, it has become more and more 
evident that a significant societal cleavage exists between those who actively 
supported the implementation of Dayton Accords and those who sought to 
obstruct such implementation. This cleavage highlights the need for the par-
ticipation of moderate political actors, because in Bosnia it has been the 
Representative, Decision Establishing the Expert Commission on Intelligence Reform (May 30, 
2003), available at http://www.ohr.int/decisions/staternattersdec/default.asp?content_id=29988. 
Both Entity officials and the High Representative appoint the members of both of these commis-
sions. The High Representative's decisions also identify specific experts that serve as commis-
sion members. /d. 
317 See, e.g., supra notes 154 and 268 and accompanying text (discussing local expert in-
volvement in drafting property laws and election law). 
318 For example as recently as June 2004, the High Representative threatened the HDZ, SDA, 
and SBiH with fines for failing to harmonize the Primary and Secondary Education legislation 
of specific cantons with the State-level framework law. Office of the High Representative, 
High Representative Imposes Fines on Parties that Challenge Rule of Law (June 7, 2004), 
available at http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/presso/pressr/default.asp?content_id=32620. 
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moderates who have actively supported the full implementation of Dayton. 
The development of mechanisms to ensure the participation of moderates in 
the development of governing coalitions is thus a useful and important strat-
egy for fostering the development of a stable and functioning Bosnian state. 
In the absence of a true grand coalition, the only segments of society 
that have participated in the development and implementation of government 
policy have been the extreme nationalists from each of the three major ethnic 
groups. These parties generally opposed the implementation of certain Day-
ton goals. The formation of coalition governments can have a moderating 
effect on the extreme positions of political parties because of their desire to 
be a part of the government. In the early post-war governments, however, 
the coalition-forming process had no such effect because the three nationalist 
parties-SDA, HDZ, and SDS-that comprised the governments were more 
like a single majority party creating a one-party cabinet rather than three dis-
tinct parties forming a coalition. There was little disagreement amongst 
these parties, and hence, little negotiating to develop policy positions that 
were acceptable to all three parties. As a result of this situation, the conso-
ciational model did not provide a structural basis for the development of a 
strong, functioning, unified, and multiethnic Bosnian state. The extreme na-
tionalist parties carried out their agenda, which consisted of limiting the de-
velopment of a central Bosnian state and solidifying the post-war ethnic 
demographics in contravention of the Dayton Peace Agreement addressing 
refugees and displaced persons. To counteract this trend the High Represen-
tative began unilaterally implementing legislation and removing municipal, 
canton, entity, and state officials deemed to be obstructing the implementa-
tion of Dayton.319 While such action falls within the ambit of international 
territorial administration in post-conflict societies (as discussed in Part IV), 
it is not sustainable in the long-term. As many critics have noted, knowing 
that the High Representative will make unilateral decisions makes Bosnia 
more dependent on the international community and enables elected officials 
to avoid making difficult decisions. Perhaps most importantly, a highly in-
terventionist OHR deprives Bosnian society of an opportunity to build effec-
tive institutions and techniques for resolving political conflicts.320 Under-
standably frustrated by the lack of progress in Bosnia, the High 
Representative developed a strategy that delivered specific results. After the 
319 See discussion infra Part IV. 
320 See, e.g., Knaus & Martin, supra note 229, at 60. See also Ian Traynor, Ashdown 'Run-
ning Bosnia Like a Raj, ' THE GUARDIAN, July 5, 2003, available at http ://www.guardian.co. 
uk/international/story/0,3604,991947,00.html; King Paddy, THE GuARDIAN, Oct. 11, 2002, 
available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/g2/story/0,3604,809691 ,OO.htrnl. 
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High Representative's successful intervention in revising Bosnia's property 
laws, a process was created for refugees and displaced persons to regain pos-
session of property lost during the war. A significant number of individuals 
have reacquired their pre-war property, thus facilitating minority returns. It 
is possible, however, that similar results could have been obtained by utiliz-
ing a process that revised Bosnia's political structure in a way that truly op-
erationalized Dayton's consociational plan for Bosnia. Creating an advisory 
committee, like the one proposed above, is one tool that can be utilized to 
facilitate a successful power-sharing political system. Such institutions must 
have a clear process for identifying the society's significant segments and a 
rules-based procedure for including representatives from all of these groups 
within the grand coalition. This is particularly important when a society's 
political structure, like the one created by the Bosnian Constitution, is in-
flexible and fails to provide means for addressing unidentified and unimag-
ined conflicts amongst various segments of society. With the proper man-
date and procedural rules, an advisory committee could serve as a grand 
coalition in Bosnia, finally enabling all of significant segments of society to 
participate in the development of government policy. Such broad-based in-
volvement is critical for developing legitimate and enforceable solutions to 
politically difficult problems. By establishing a permanent advisory com-
mittee, the High Representative can create a local democratic institution that 
would provide a forum in which local actors could develop solutions to hu-
man rights dilemmas. Creating such local institutions is an important part of 
a nation-building project because its builds a local capacity for addressing 
controversial issues peacefully. 
